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INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6537
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7164
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0013
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7310
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000464
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 10/18/2029
TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL NATO ZB RS
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: BALTIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING: SOME
IDEAS
REF: A. VILNIUS 533
B. VILNIUS 527
C. TALLIN 309
D. RIGA 514
E. SECRETARY (SECTO) 007
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) This is an action request. See paragraph 10.
2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Leaders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
are pressing hard for NATO Article 5 contingency planning for
the Baltic states. President Obama and Secretary Clinton are
on record supporting such contingency planning for Allies.
At the same time, however, NATO internal processes and
politics make it difficult to openly carry out such planning,
particularly if it would require specifying Russia as a
potential threat. Nevertheless, there are possible ways to
meet the substance of Baltic demands. The existing
contingency plan for Poland, for example, might be modified
to include the Baltics or generic plans for the use of the
NATO Response Force could be exercised and certified in a
manner consistent with Baltic defense. We request high-level
interagency discussion of the issue to develop the substance
and NATO tactics of Baltic planning and exercises. END
SUMMARY
Why Baltic Contingency Planning?
--------------------------------
3. (S/NF) As reported in refs A-D, leaders in Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania are pressing hard for NATO Article 5
contingency planning for the defense of the Baltics. The
Administration at the highest levels is on record supporting
such efforts. President Obama told NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen this during the latter's September 28-29 trip to
Washington. Furthermore, Secretary Clinton told her
colleagues at the September 22 "Trans-Atlantic Dinner" in New
York that the U.S. wants more work on Article 5 contingency
plans (ref E).
The Difficulties
----------------
4. (S/NF) At the same time, the internal processes and
politics of the Alliance make it unlikely that a Baltic-only
Article 5 contingency plan could be developed. NATO
contingency plans are designed for possible future security
risks that are consistent with NATO's General Intelligence
Estimate (MC 161) and NATO Ministerial Guidance. While
Admiral Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR), does have the authority to generate, review and
revise contingency plans based on changes in the strategic
security environment, those changes to the security
environment would need to be reflected in MC 161. Without a
change to MC 161, SACEUR does not have the authority to
develop new Article 5 contingency plans. Moreover, changes
to MC 161 are not made by SACEUR. They must be agreed by the
NAC.
5. (S/NF) In this case, the Baltic states clearly believe
that the Russian Federation represents a future security risk
and desire a contingency plan to address that risk. And
therein lies the problem. While the exact content of MC 161
cannot be discussed in this message, post-Cold War NATO has
consistently said that it no longer views Russia as a threat.
Allies, for example, agreed to language in the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act that "NATO and Russia do not
consider each other as adversaries." As we saw during the
debates over the Russia-Georgia war, many Allies will take
great pains to avoid even the suggestion that the Alliance
and Russia are on course toward a new Cold War. Countries
such as Germany are unlikely to agree changes to MC 161 that
explicitly define Russia as a potential threat, preferring
instead to argue that the Alliance needs to find a way to
work cooperatively with Moscow.
USNATO 00000464 002 OF 003
But Hard is Not "Too Hard"
--------------------------
6. (S/NF) Despite these difficulties, however, there are
steps that can be taken to meet the substance of the Baltic
demands and demonstrate the Allied commitment to their
defense. As a start, SACEUR did begin conducting informal
"prudent planning" efforts within his own Headquarters in the
wake of the Russian-Georgian war. These efforts should
continue. Furthermore, the existing NATO contingency plan
for Poland is up for revision. We could explore the
possibility of revising this plan to include the
reinforcement/defense of the Baltics as an element of the
reinforcement/defense of Poland. Indeed, this idea was first
raised by the German PermRep in conversation with Ambassador
Daalder. NATO also has a number of agreed generic
contingency plans for the NATO Response Force (NRF),
including for relatively high-end "initial entry operations."
Perhaps these generic NRF plans can be exercised/certified
in a manner that would be consistent with the defense of the
Baltics. Finally, we could pursue a generic Article 5
Alliance-wide contingency plan which would be applicable to
multiple threats.
Necessary for NATO-Russia; Expeditionary Forces
--------------------------------------------- --
7. (S/NF) Baltic reassurance can not be seen in isolation.
Our ability to move forward with other U.S. priorities at
NATO will be affected by our ability to reassure the Baltic
states. For example, our ability to maintain an Allied
consensus on re-engagement with Moscow will depend on it.
Furthermore, the Baltic states have made clear that if they
do not feel they can trust Allies to defend them, they will
have to consider developing a force structure focused on
territorial defense rather than on expeditionary capabilities.
U.S. Reassurance Does Not Equal NATO Reassurance
--------------------------------------------- ---
8. (S/NF) The U.S. has taken a number of bilateral steps to
reassure the Baltics, including tasking the U.S. European
Command (which ADM Stavridis heads under his U.S.-only hat)
to develop a plan for supporting NATO deterrence and defense
in the Baltic region. While these efforts can be useful in
supporting NATO contingency planning and reassurance efforts,
if done on their own they could actually undermine our
efforts to reassure the Baltic states that all NATO Allies
will carry out their Article 5 commitments. Defense of the
Baltics must remain a NATO Article 5 commitment, not solely a
U.S. bilateral one. Unless consensus can be achieved within
the Alliance to take positive steps in this direction, the
Baltic states will continue to lose faith in the Alliance,
undercutting a key U.S. strategic objective. Washington
should not allow U.S. bilateral reassurance efforts to become
an easy substitute for NATO-wide efforts.
Recommended Way Ahead
---------------------
9. (S/NF) Ambassador Daalder has been having quiet
conversations with some Allies, as well as with SACEUR, to
see what might be possible. We believe that a key aspect of
any approach would be to socialize the NAC on the issue
through briefings by SACEUR on current plans and the extent
to which they satisfy the requirement to defend Allied
territory. In addition to further consideration of the ideas
in para 6 above, Mission proposes the following as an initial
way ahead on this issue that we should seek to set in train:
-- The Military Committee should task NATO Military
Authorities to review the current family of contingency plans
to determine if they are sufficient to meet NATO's Article 5
commitments;
USNATO 00000464 003 OF 003
-- The North Atlantic Council should ask SACEUR to brief
PermReps on the status of these plans and on their ability to
provide for the defense/protection of Allied territory,
populations, and Alliance interests;
-- SHAPE should request that each Ally assess its own
national plans and national contributions in support of these
plans;
-- Strategic communications/public messaging regarding NATO
contingency planning would allow the Alliance to highlight
its efforts to provide for the protection of Alliance
territory from the range of threats;
-- Ongoing Strategic Concept discussion and seminars should
be used to identify new security threats and ways to meet
those threats. This process could help build consensus for
new contingency planning efforts;
-- The U.S. should consider the possibility/suitability of
adapting the upcoming USEUCOM bilateral exercise, "Baltic
Host 2010," into a NATO deterrence and defense of the Baltic
states exercise; and
-- As NATO contingency plans are developed, task the
development of supporting USEUCOM contingency plans.
10. (S/NF) Mission requests that a NATO IPC be scheduled in
the near future to discuss this issue further, with a view to
developing a coherent interagency-agreed strategy on how to
take forward the President's vision of contingency planning
in NATO.
DAALDER ---------- VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #7892 3491053
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O 151050Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0000 S E C R E T STATE 127892 NOFORN FOLLOWING STATE 127892 DATED 150910Z DEC 09 SENT ACTION RIGA, TALLINN, VILNIUS, USNATO INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 127892 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: NATO MARR MCAP PREL EN LG LH PL SUBJECT: NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OUR BALTIC ALLIES REFS: A) USNATO 561 B) USNATO 464 C) VILNIUS 569 D) RIGA 514 Classified By: ACTING EUR A/S NANCY MCELDOWNEY -FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 2-3. 2. (S/NF) Summary and Action Request. The United States is developing a strategy for reaffirming both NATO and U.S. commitment to the core responsibility of the Alliance: collective defense. Examining NATO's approach to contingency planning will be one element of that strategy. Moving from country-specific to regional contingency plans is one potential method. Expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN could be a first step in favor of regional planning. USNATO should engage NATO Secretary General Rasmussen to begin to build support for expanding Eagle Guardian. In early 2010, the U.S. Military Representative (MILREP) at NATO HQ should take the following actions: 1) meet jointly with the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), the German MILREP, and other MILREPs as appropriate to urge the CMC to task the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to include the Baltic States in the revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN, and 2) approach the CMC and request that he task SACEUR to brief the Military Committee on each of NATO's contingency plans with guidance that he identify any gaps in those plans. We will be better positioned to consider a broader regional approach after receiving SACEUR's assessment USNATO and Action Embassies are asked to engage with appropriate Baltic and Polish officials before December 16 to outline the U.S. position, while stressing the need to keep details related to NATO's military plans confidential. Contingency points are also provided at paragraph 4 for responding to public inquiries. End Summary and Action Request. 3. (S) Washington shares USNATO's goal of a non-politicized process for moving forward. Washington believes that increased public attention on the issue could complicate our efforts to achieve that goal. We need to make that point clearly to our Baltic Allies and Poland, while also underscoring that we take their request for NATO contingency planning seriously and support steps to address their concerns. We understand Baltic and Polish leaders will meet on December 16 and will discuss, among other topics, NATO contingency planning. It will be important to engage with Baltic and Polish officials in advance of that meeting to both outline our support for expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN, and our vision for a process that can deliver a successful result. In discussions with Baltic and Polish officials, Action Posts should draw upon the points below. (S/REL NATO) Begin Talking Points: FOR RIGA, TALLINN, AND VILNIUS -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeated requests by all three Baltic states for NATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations. NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work
together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans
in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come
from."-- After spending the last several months examining options on how to carry out NATO contingency planning for the Baltic states, the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of the ongoing revision of the existing defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded to include the defense of the Baltic states. This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan and fits well within the scenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats -- both regional and functional -- as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to work closely with NATO Military Authorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopens following its winter break. (S/REL NATO) FOR WARSAW -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeated requests by all three Baltic states for NATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations. NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work
together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans
in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come
from."-- After spending the last several months examining options for how to carry out NATO contingency planning for the Baltic states, the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of the ongoing revision of the existing defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded to include the defense of the Baltic states. -- This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan and fits well within the scenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. In fact, defending Poland necessarily entails defending the Baltic states, as well. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats - both regional and functional - as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to work closely with NATO Military Authorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopens following its winter break. -- We do not believe that this will result in any significant delays for concluding the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision. Nor do we believe that this in any way endangers planning for the defense of Poland. In fact, we believe that the planning for the defense of Poland will be much more robust with the inclusion of the Baltics. (S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PLANS (FOR USE AT POST'S DISCRETION) -- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not be discussed
publicly. These military plans are classified at the NATO SECRET level.-- The Alliance has many public diplomacy tools at its disposal. Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public steps for demonstrating the vitality of Article 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships. -- Public discussion of contingency plans undermines their military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens the security of all Allies. -- Public discussion of the plan would also make it politically much more difficult for some Allies to support the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision, creating divisions within the Alliance and throwing the whole project into doubt. -- A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest. -- We believe that the proposed revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN is achievable and will represent a significant response to the Baltic request for contingency planning. -- We hope that we can count on your support in these
efforts, including on keeping discussions on NATO
contingency planning out of the public domain.-- We should work together on using exercises, defense investment, and partnerships to demonstrate to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies in NATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather than specific planning. (C) FOR ALL ACTION POSTS -- IF ASKED Q: Why wait until the new year? Why not start now? A: NATO Headquarters is heading into its winter break, when only a skeletal staff is in place. Our ability to achieve success in this matter will be substantially improved once senior Allied personnel have returned to work early in the new year. We pledge to take the matter up expeditiously at that time. Q: Will waiting until the new year give NATO Military Authorities sufficient time to complete the revision of the EAGLE GUARDIAN? A: According to our conversations with NATO's senior military authorities, beginning the process of incorporating the Baltic states into EAGLE GUARDIAN in early January still gives them sufficient time to complete the revision by February as originally planned. 4. (C) Washington strongly prefers that discussion of
NATO's contingency plans in general, and the possible
expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN in particular, remain in
confidential channels. However, posts may use the points
below if necessary in responding to public queries about
these issues.
(U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IF ASKED:
-- NATO does not discuss specific plans.
-- As a matter of course, however, NATO does planning in
order to be as prepared as possible for whatever
situations might arise, particularly as relates to its
ability to carrying out its Article 5 commitments.
-- Plans are not static. NATO is constantly reviewing and
revising its plans.
-- NATO planning, however, is an internal process designed
to make the Alliance as prepared as possible for future
contingencies. It is not "aimed" at any other country.
-- President Obama acknowledged this when he said at
Prague that "We must work together as NATO members so that
we have contingency plans in place to deal with new
threats, wherever they may come from."
CLINTON UNQUOTE CLINTON ----- VZCZCXRO8554
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #7810/01 0262036
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 262029Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6905 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 007810 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS MARR, MCAP, NATO, PREL, EN, LG, LH, PL SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF EAGLE GUARDIAN TO INCLUDE BALTIC ALLIES REF: A. USNATO 35 B. 09 STATE 127892 Classified By: EUR PDAS Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 3-4. 2. (S) Summary and Action Request. On January 22 NATO Allies agreed in the Military Committee to expand the NATO Contingency Plan for Poland, EAGLE GUARDIAN, to include the defense and reinforcement of the Baltic States. Posts in Allied capitals should be prepared to explain, as necessary, U.S. support for this approach and how it fits within our broader vision for NATO contingency planning, as well as how to respond to media inquiries on the matter. Posts are asked to draw on the points below, as necessary, in discussions on this issue. End Summary and Action Request.
3. (C) Posts need not engage host government officials proactively on NATO contingency planning at this time, but are encouraged to use the points below as the basis for discussions on the matter as needed.
(S/REL NATO) CONTINGENCY POINTS (FOR USE AT POST,S DISCRETION)
-- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations.
-- As President Obama said in Prague: “We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from. -- The U.S. welcomes the decision to expand EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, and sees it as a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan that fits well within the existing scenario.
-- We see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi-stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats - both regional and functional - as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. (S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PLANS (FOR USE AT POST'S DISCRETION) -- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not be discussed publicly. These military plans are classified at the NATO SECRET level.
-- The Alliance has many public diplomacy tools at its disposal. Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public steps for demonstrating the vitality of Article 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships.
-- Public discussion of contingency plans undermines their military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens the security of all Allies. -- A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest.
-- We hope that we can count on your support in keeping discussions on NATO contingency planning out of the public domain.
-- We should work together to develop strategies - to include activities such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships - for demonstrating to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies in NATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather than specific planning.
4. (C) Washington strongly believes that the details of NATO,s contingency plans should remain in confidential channels. However, recent press coverage of NATO decisions regarding possible contingency planning options for the Baltic region may lead to additional media inquiries. If necessary, posts may use the points below in responding to
STATE 00007810 002 OF 002
public queries.
(U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IF ASKED:
-- NATO does not discuss specific plans.
-- As a matter of course, however, NATO engages in planning in order to be as prepared as possible for whatever situations might arise, particularly as relates to its ability to carrying out its Article 5 commitments.
-- Plans are not static. NATO is constantly reviewing and revising its plans.
-- NATO planning is an internal process designed to make the Alliance as prepared as possible for future contingencies. It is not "aimed" at any other country.
-- President Obama acknowledged this when he said at Prague that "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." CLINTON
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