State Dept. cites kiosk's links to organized crime and money laundering....
January , 2012 -- State Department in-depth report on Israeli kiosk vendors in U.S.
On January 25, 2010, the U.S. State Department issued an in-depth report on the operations of Israeli kiosk vendors in shopping malls across the United States. Although the report, released in the tranche of cables exposed by WikiLeaks, did not mention the links of these Israeli vendors to Israeli intelligence operations in the United States, the report does provide an insight into the vendors' ties to money laundering, organized crime, and visa violations.
The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv recommended a ban on U.S. visas for any Israeli having just completed military service. Most of the Israelis operating in shopping malls recently completed their obligatory military service. But as numerous U.S. intelligence reports have stated on these vendors, many specialized in demolitions, signals intelligence, and counter-intelligence operations/
The kiosk vendors are also active in Canada, as cited in this CBC report from December 22, 2010:
"A man accused of bringing illegal workers to Halifax will be allowed to stay in Toronto until his next court appearance.
Iftash Jacob was released from custody Thursday after surrendering his passport and posting a $7,500 bond.
He must report to the Canada Border Services Agency every week and return to Halifax provincial court in February to enter a plea . . .
Jacob and nine others — all from Israel — were arrested Wednesday in a raid on a home in Halifax and kiosks at three shopping malls in the region.
Border Services officials arrested an 11th person on Thursday outside a courthouse.
Eight people — two women and six men — pleaded guilty Wednesday to working in Canada without authorization, and each was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine. They are allowed to stay in the country but not work here."
The fact that the leaked cable on the Israeli operations was merely designated as "Sensitive" unclassified information may indicate that there was an addendum with a higher classification that discussed the intelligence angle of the Israeli kiosk operations.
On August 7, 2005, WMR reported:
“In November 2001, the INS arrested several Israelis, including some with military backgrounds, selling Puzzle Car and Zoom Copter toys from shopping mall kiosks and vending carts. Many of the malls were located near U.S. government facilities, including the Pentagon and CIA. A majority of the Israelis, arrested for visa violations instead of espionage, worked for a Florida-based company called Quality Sales. A spokesman for the company admitted the company hired vacationing Israeli students but they had thr wrong visas. The spokesman also revealed the Israelis were deemed “special interest” cases by INS – a new government designation applied to terrorism suspects in the wake of 911. Federal authorities suspect the Israelis were using the kiosks as intelligence fronts in the same manner that Israelis were using door-to-door art sales as covers. The National Counterintelligence Center (NCIX) stated in a report issued in March 2001 that, ‘In the past six weeks, employees in federal office buildings located throughout the United States have reported suspicious activities connected with individuals representing themselves as foreign students selling or delivering artwork. Employees have observed both males and females attempting to bypass facility security and enter federal buildings.’ The report was temporarily removed from the NCIX web site.
| ID | 10TELAVIV140 |
| SUBJECT | IN DEPTH: DEAD SEA COSMETICS AND SKINCARE INDUSTRY FRAUD |
| DATE | 2010-01-25 00:00:00 |
| CLASSIFICATION | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| ORIGIN | Embassy Tel Aviv |
| TEXT | UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000140 SENSITIVE DEPT FOR CA/FPP, SARAH SEXTON CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS DOL CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS DOJ CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS FPMS DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA DEPT FOR DS/DO/ICI DHS FOR CIS/FDNS DHS FOR CBP DHS FOR ICE ROME FOR DHS/ICE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS, ASEC, KFRD, KCRM, CMGT, PINR, IS SUBJECT: IN DEPTH: DEAD SEA COSMETICS AND SKINCARE INDUSTRY FRAUD REFTEL: A) 09 TEL AVIV 423 1.(SBU) SUMMARY: Tel Aviv has been investigating visa fraud in the U.S. Dead Sea Cosmetics and skincare industry since 2007, when it became a noticeable problem. From September 2008, Dead-Sea related fraud has been one of Tel Aviv's Fraud Prevention Unit's (FPU)and Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator's (ARSO-I) main foci. Since then Tel Aviv has learned a great deal about the multi-million dollar industry and its fraudulent activities. Of particular concern is that the majority of the workers in this industry are Israeli, whether they are B1B2 visa holders, LPRs or dual American-Israelis; key companies have told us that they prefer to hire Israelis instead of Americans. Of late, the industry has been using its KIOSK marketing experience to branch out into related fields: hair straighteners, hair extensions, hair accessories and other assorted items such as other types of cosmetics, perfumes, pillows, toys, wind spinners and even, roasted nuts. The Dead Sea industry has spread to more than 36 states, creating a major presence across America. This industry also operates in countries like Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Germany. Unfortunately, its U.S. presence is not entirely "clean," for there are known issues of B1B2 visa holders working illegally; illegal worker exploitation; no federal or local taxes being paid on workers' earnings; filing applications for extensions and/or changes of status as a means of continuing illegal work; bogus marriages to keep key staff in the United States; B1 in lieu of H3 letter and H3 visa scams; non-transparent corporate structures established to create distance from illegal workers; transport of huge sums of cash to Israel suggesting organized crime and money laundering; as well as an increased number of real estate ventures that suggest the same. Moreover, it is culturally acceptable for post-army Israelis to work illegally in the United States; key parts of the Dead Sea industry have been able to base a large part of their business models upon the employment of illegal workers. These issues and other important topics of concern will be delineated in this lengthy background cable. The unifying factor is that all of these issues have wider implications. Aside from the criminal aspects of this fraud, a key implication is the increased visa revocation/refusal and denial of entry rates for post-army Israelis, which among other things, complicate Israel's high-profile desire to join the Visa Waiver Program. Contact information for readers who wish to receive e-mail updates is available at the end of this cable. END SUMMARY -------------------------------------------- H2B Workers Capped - B1B2 Workers Essential -------------------------------------------- 2.(SBU)The number of H2B workers has been capped at 66,000 per fiscal year, with 33,000 to be allocated for employment beginning in the 1st half of the fiscal year. From 1 Oct-31 Dec 2009, Tel Aviv issued 283 H2Bs-all for the Dead Sea industry. Our experience tells us that there are far more than 283 Israelis working at KIOSKs across the United States--we suspect the numbers to be in the thousands; those additional, illegal workers are mainly B1B2 visa holders as that path is far cheaper and less hassle than filing petitions, and etc. The Dead Sea industry knows it cannot sustain itself with just H2B, H3, J1 SWT, E and L visa and American-Israeli workers. Thus, B1B2 workers (B1B2ers) are vital to their oft-stated plans to employ only Israelis. Further, an argument can be made that these companies are hiring in a discriminatory fashion in that their main goal is to hire Israeli workers to the exclusion of others. To illustrate how crucial B1B2ers are to these companies: say a Dead Sea company has 2-4 KIOSKs in nine medium-sized metropolitan-area malls with 2-3 workers per KIOSK. Assume 3 KIOSKs per mall and 2-3 workers per KIOSK. The number of workers ranges from 54-81 in this area with just ONE company. Now, extrapolate that scenario across the United States. With the hundreds of Dead Sea companies and thousands of KIOSKs in existence, it becomes clear that Israeli-Americans, H2Bs, Js, etc. cannot sustain the Israeli workforce plan--B1B2ers do. Given that there are many more KIOSKs now than several years ago, it becomes more obvious that the decline in H2Bs and the rise in B1B2ers enabled the H2B program to become a "fig leaf" for these companies and their illegal workers. 3.(SBU)Bolstering the above scenario is Document Benefits Task Force (DBTF) information (passed to ARSO-I) containing names of 50 Israeli B1B2 or VWP workers who had been working in the Houston area. Post is currently analyzing these 50 cases: 22 B1B2s were issued by Tel Aviv in 2008-9 alone; 11 B1B2s were issued by Tel Aviv prior to 2008; 11 are thought to be VWP nationals and, 6 names were too common to distinguish. Further, the DBTF's activities have led to a particular company's scramble to replace/move elsewhere their B2 workers with those holding H2Bs. 4.(SBU)ARSO-I has been notifying the Government of Israel (GOI) of all incoming criminal deportations from the United States. He also receives notification of all deportations and has noticed a sharp increase in young Israelis being deported for overstays or visa status violations. Though anecdotal evidence, it points to a wider problem. 5.(SBU) The list of 50 Houston-based workers is not the first or only one Tel Aviv's Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) has received; CBP sent a list of 60+ workers who had been discovered working illegally at a Florida-based company. As part of a multi-faceted fraud strategy, FPM has since revoked (and sent revocation requests to CA) a large number of B1B2s belonging to known workers. Tel Aviv's interviewing officers are constantly trying to find ways to detect Israelis who intend to work; needless to say, coaching and other assistance has made it very difficult to detect these cases. An analysis of case notes pertaining to the applicants on both lists showed that most of these Israelis had given solid stories, thereby convincing consular officers to overcome 214b. The toughest aspect for 214b is not determining whether the applicant will return, but whether s/he will abide by their visa's terms. Tel Aviv FPU is open to ideas on improving its detection of those intending to work; we are continually brainstorming solutions, but none have proven effective thus far. 6.(SBU) H2B statistics: In the past several fiscal years, Tel Aviv's overall H2B workload has dropped from a high of 1,658 cases in FY 2008 down by more than half to 528 cases in FY 2009. Reflecting enhanced scrutiny of these applications is the increase in the FY 2010 H2B refusal rate to 45 percent from 10.9 percent in FY 2008. H2Bs FY 2006: 179 H2Bs issued; 25 refused. (204 cases) FY 2007: 997 H2B issued; 79 refused. (1,076 cases) FY 2008: 1,495 H2B issued; 163 refused. (1,658 cases) FY 2009: 381 H2Bs issued; 146 refused. (528 cases) FY 2010 to Dec 31: 283 H2Bs issued; 129 refused. (412 cases) -------------------------------------------- Recruitment of B1B2 Workers: Well-Organized -------------------------------------------- 7.(SBU) Recruitment of B1B2ers is largely peer- and Internet- oriented and occurs year-round; not surprisingly, recruiters and Dead Sea managers themselves are usually former illegal KIOSK workers. It also begins while they are still in the military; recruiters have participated in job fairs for those finishing their mandatory service. The hiring process is highly organized and done with no paper trail. 8.(SBU)Israelis preparing to leave the army generally want to earn money (whether domestically or abroad) to pay for school, travel and other life goals. Israelis have a close-knit social network and as such, it is not hard to find peers who have worked illegally and be reassured by the fact that they were not caught. FPM spoke with an Israeli who had been swept up in a raid, and he said that the vast majority of his peers obtain a tourist visa with intentions of working and that a majority are not caught. This situation creates a relatively permissive recruitment environment. While in the United States, an Israeli can walk up to a KIOSK and ask about employment; they also can utilize online social networks such as Facebook to find jobs. 9.(SBU) With a few variations, recruiters rosily promise such things as the ability to earn USD 3-4,000 per month, 20-30 percent commission, payment of half of the airfare, housing at resort-like apartment complexes and availability of a car. In some locations, rent is a token sum and in others, upwards of USD 500 per month is charged. Qualifications are minimal: strong English skills and a U.S. visa. 10.(SBU)Companies advertise in newspapers and online; an interested worker only needs to complete a questionnaire and wait until someone calls them. Typically, they are given a number to call when they land in the United States. One variation is that recruiters will meet the prospective worker at a local cafe or mall to finalize details. Others call Web-site listed telephone numbers and leave a message; someone returns their call and then convinces them to work. If they don't have a U.S. visa, recruiters have been known to coach them on how to evade our scrutiny. 11.(SBU)Prior to arrival in the United States, workers typically are given an address to write on their I-94-which may or may not exist. Upon arrival in the United States, they usually are met at the airport and taken to their housing. Should there be problems at immigration, they are provided with a number for someone closely connected to this industry. As described by a former Israeli worker, the entire process was "all well organized." Substantiating this is an I275 Q/A comment, "They know when we are coming. They come to the airport to collect us." --------------------------------------------- -- B1B2ers: Lack of Consequences Helps Dead Sea Industry and Perpetuates Israelis' Cultural Acceptance of Illegal Work --------------------------------------------- -- 12.(SBU)There is an array of reasons why post-army Israelis work illegally in the United States; a key part of this fraud problem is these young Israelis' cultural acceptable of illegal work. The prevailing perception amongst these Israelis is that selling Dead Sea products is a simple way to earn a lot of money, can be done easily and that most are not caught. One turnaround said, "people [in Israel] told me it was ok [to sell Dead Sea products]. There are a lot of people [who] sell Dead Sea products in the United States." According to another Israeli who was caught and jailed, most of his peers know they intend to work well before applying for U.S. visas and obligingly tell interviewing officers that they know this work is illegal. Illustrating the situation's pervasiveness is that some Israelis travel annually to work; others travel every two years. This Israeli also estimated that there are "thousands of B1B2 workers across the United States"; statistics and anecdotal evidence cited in this cable strongly support this estimate. He also theorized that quite a few come from the lower end of the socioeconomic scale--not poor, and not upper middle class. Post has seen cases of Israelis relinquishing good jobs, such as those with the National Police, to work illegally and cases of illegal Israeli workers with a high-profile government or corporate parent. Of note is that, due to the preference for Army service, Israeli-Arab KIOSK workers are rare. 13.(SBU)The deception by those intending to work illegally begins well before they arrive at the visa interview window and repeats at POEs. In a secondary interview with CBP, one turnaround said, "....I don't remember who told me what to say, but everyone in Israel knows about going to America to work, and they say to tell the U.S. Embassy that you're going on vacation. It's easier to get the via." Companies and recruiters have been known to advise applicants to: create a fake reason for the trip, such as attending a friend's wedding (in one case, CBP discovered the friend was already married!); and not to worry as "[After entering] as a tourist... they would take care of my paperwork." Other examples are instructions to: "...tell US consular officials that he intended to visit a friend's aunt in NYC so that he could obtain a US visa and, "...to tell POE that I was coming for "retail manager in training program" (she worked as a secretary for a Dead Sea CEO). In addition to the lies, this B1B2 applicant pool tends to write on their DS 156's "None" for their U.S. destination and contact information (they know that if they were to put Ohio, we'd know they intended to work). Interviewing officers have a hard time pinning them down to an exact U.S. address or contact as they generally say they are going to New York or some other common destination to see family such as an uncle or aunt (when they intend to work in AZ, TX, OH, TN or even in AL). By contrast, H2B applicants diligently provide this information as given to them by the companies. 14.(SBU)In general, KIOSK workers are not a static bunch. Some work several weeks or months at a KIOSK in one area, say Cleveland, and then shift to another area such as Las Vegas for a few weeks or months and so on. A strong network of Israelis paves the way for their job moves-if things do not work out at one KIOSK, an Israeli can call upon the network to help his/her transfer to a another KIOSK which could be local or out of state. -------------------- Paying B1B2 Workers -------------------- 15.(SBU) KIOSK area managers and/or U.S.-based recruiters usually take care of compensating their illegal workers. Pay tends to range from USD 1,000-3,200 per month, with the majority paid on the mid to lower end of this scale. It is rare to earn a lot of money and, as expected, the higher end is occupied by those who excel at sales. Tel Aviv is aware of situations in which workers end up owing their employers money. 16.(SBU)The most common method of payment is cash "under the table." Per I275 reports, an assortment of cash payment methods exists: having the worker establish a U.S. bank account and then depositing cash or checks; pay worker USD 1,000 for the first month while still in Israel and then thereafter, pay USD 300 per week--the USD 1,000 would be deposited into an Israeli bank account and USD 300 given in cash once state-side; having their pay wired to an Israeli bank account; having the worker open a U.S. credit card account and transferring money to the card, and etc. Some workers know that no local or federal taxes are being deducted from their pay; others are told that "that has been taken care of." -------------------------------- B1B2 Worker Exploitation Issues -------------------------------- 17.(SBU)The methods of exploitation we have seen are: a. Payment of prohibited H2B fees. Those who withdraw from H2B work early state-side or while still in Israel have been unable to receive refunds of the extra, and prohibited, monies they had paid. Exemplifying this situation is a company that is known to charge Israeli H2B applicants a $100 fee as collateral for visa approval; if denied their H2Bs that company refused to return that money to the applicants on the basis that the failure to obtain a visa was the applicants' fault, not theirs. In addition, that same company charges H2B candidates half of the $1,000 cost to petition for the visa; the candidate pays $100 prior to leaving Israel and the remaining $400 is deducted from their first four salary payments. b. "Legal" status: Company told person that s/he could work legally on the B-1; told him/her it was "ok to work and that nothing was going to happen." When that person asked the recruiter about a work visa, s/he was told "not to worry about it." One company even told B1B2ers that "[they] can work for 3 months legally and after 3 months, [they] can't." c. Job deceit: One person thought he had started a real job with an Israeli company and that he was being sent to the United States for training; he soon discovered that the "training" would be work and that there was no job waiting for him back in Israel. These companies have been known to move their employees around as they see fit. An Israeli, originally recruited to work in the logistics department, was transferred to a KIOSK when the company needed more cart workers. Another variation is to promise to send a worker to, say, Los Angeles, and upon arrival, send them to, say, El Paso. d. Long hours, little pay. Six day workweeks and 11 hr workdays are not uncommon. Some workers are paid only their commission, e.g. no minimum wage salary. The majority are not paid anywhere near the $3-4,000+ a month promised by recruiters. An Israeli who quit his H2B job this month informed us that he and his colleagues had been paid only a basic salary of $1500 a month and that their company took $500 a month from each of them to cover living expenses, such as rent. After adding in other expenses, they ended up having to pay their employer money when they left, earning nothing, contrary to what was promised. e. No local or Federal taxes paid. Given that the tendency to be paid in cash, most workers do not know that taxes must be paid on money earned. Nor do the companies enlighten them. f. Social Security Numbers (SSNs). Illegalities abound in this area as shared SSNs, fraudulent SSNs and having no SSN are not uncommon. g. Employment Eligibility Verification I-9 forms not completed for workers. Dead Sea companies have failed to complete I-9s for their workers. All U.S. employers must complete and retain an I-9 for each worker-including citizens and noncitizens. On the I-9, the company must examine the employment eligibility and identity document(s) a worker presents to determine whether the document(s) reasonably appear to be genuine and relate to the individual and record that document information on the I-9. This documentation provision is likely the sticking point for these companies as they do not want any evidence of hiring B1B2ers. h. Organized Crime enforcement tactics: ARSO-I and FPM are aware of recruiters who threaten workers if they do not do their work as intended. One such recruiter threatened a worker's family back in Israel with harm if the worker did not continue working at the KIOSK . ARSO-I is looking into these cases for prosecutorial potential. i. Department of Labor violations. Examples include assigning workers to employment locations different from those listed on the DOL certifications. As mentioned above, companies have been known to move workers around at will, according to current needs. j. And, no doubt, there are other methods of exploitation not described here. --------------------------------------------- - I-539 Extensions Filed to Continue Unauthorized Work --------------------------------------------- - 18.(SBU)Many B1B2ers fail to disclose unlawful employment on their I539s to extend current status or switch to H2B or even H3 status. These applications are filed as a way to buy time to continue working. To reduce scrutiny, Israelis have been known to file I539s in a different state from where they had been residing. 19.(SBU)Another known tactic to keep Israeli workers in the United States is petitioning for a change of status for their workers from B2 to H3 in April since the companies have typically claimed their "peak load" occurs during the Christmas holiday season. To complicate things further, they even petition to change the same H2Bs who entered as B2s and then worked in the KIOSKs during the holiday season over to H3 trainees after they re-enter the United States as B2s again in April and May. The H3 classification is very problematic; see paragraphs 22-30. --------------- Marriage Fraud --------------- 20.(SBU) There seems to be an overwhelming indication that the owners, principal partners and area managers of Dead Sea-related companies are enlisting U.S. citizens to commit marriage fraud in order to enable their open-ended "legal" U.S. stays. These "couples" knowingly engage in fraud, with payments to the U.S. citizen and pre-organized meetings to prepare for their USCIS interviews. In October, Tel Aviv investigated a marriage fraud case on behalf of USCIS Phoenix that resulted in the withdrawal of both the I130 and I485 forms. USCIS is investigating other cases of Dead Sea-related marriage fraud and Tel Aviv is willing to assist as necessary. ---------------- Crooked Lawyers? ---------------- 21.(SBU)Lawyers appear to very much a part of the Dead Sea fraud scheme. FPU is aware of a lawyer who advised an Israeli to obtain a new PPT to hide his/her lengthy U.S. stay. Another lawyer reassured a group of B1H3 workers that they were in "legal status" whilst their I539s were pending with USCIS. Skating close to ethical "lines," one lawyer even advised a high-level Dead Sea company owner (who was denied a visa in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem) as to whether attempting to cross illegally from Mexico was preferable to Canada. That individual was caught trying to cross the U.S.-Mexican border by making false claim to U.S. citizenship; ARSO-I is working with DS/LAFO/DS on this case. Such is the draw for Israelis working in this industry in the United States that they are willing to risk detention and possible prison time to work there. Most tellingly, ARSO-I and Tel Aviv FPM have noticed that there are a handful of lawyers who have been filing the vast majority of the Dead Sea industry's petitions, I539s and I130s/I485s with USCIS. Sometimes, new lawyers pop up, though they, too, appear to have connections to these key lawyers. --------------------------------------- Recent Arrests of Israeli B1B2 Workers --------------------------------------- 22.(SBU)Tel Aviv CONS and ARSO-I are pleased with the uptick in attention various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and U.S. Attorneys have given to the B1B2er problem. In November, Houston's ICE Documents and Benefits Fraud Task Force (DBTF) arrested 11 Israeli B1B2ers as part of a wider operation; ICE Seattle (Tri-cities office) arrested 11 more in late December and another Seattle office had arrested 5 earlier. These arrests' timing has been fortuitous to Tel Aviv's ongoing educational campaign targeted to the post-army demographic about the potential consequences of working illegally in the United States. We hope these arrests and Tel Aviv's recent 214B revocations of large numbers of B1B2ers' visas will filter through the close-knit post-army community and encourage them to think twice about working illegally. On a side note, these revocations ensure that B1B2ers cannot re-enter the United States; some have been admitted despite TECS and other lookout entries for them. ------------------------------------------ B1 in Lieu of H3 Training Letter and H3 Scam ------------------------------------------ 23.(SBU) On B1 in Lieu of H3 trainee (B1H3) issues, 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 says: a. Aliens already employed abroad, who are coming to undertake training and who are classifiable as H3 trainees. The regulations state that in order for an alien to be classifiable as H3, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) The proposed training is not available in the alien's own country; (2) The beneficiary will not be placed in a position which is in the normal operation of the business and in which citizens and resident workers are regularly employed; (3) The beneficiary will not engage in productive employment unless such employment is incidental and necessary to the training; and (4) The training will benefit the beneficiary in pursuing a career outside the United States. 24.(SBU)Note that ALL four conditions in 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 must be met to qualify for H3 status. The most difficult item to overcome is condition 1. Israel does have a Dead Sea skincare and cosmetics industry in which Israelis sell to American tourists, people from all over the world and to local customers. Thus, per this interpretation, this H3 training field IS available in Israel. In addition, 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 (4) says the training is supposed to benefit the Israeli's career abroad--however that standard is also tough to meet as these Israelis tend not to have had Dead Sea-related careers prior to going to the United States for their B1H3 "training." Their work back-grounds tend to encompass portable employment fields such as bartending, working at a gas station, cell phone sales/service, working as a secretary, etc. 25.(SBU) It is rare that young, post-army Israelis present a visa application to us requesting B1 in lieu of H3 status. In fact, Tel Aviv's Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) is aware of only one such visa case at post since the summer of 2008--that one was refused on 214b grounds. Of concern is the situation in which Israelis in this demographic present B1H3 letters to CBP officers at Ports of Entry for admission for 3-6 months' training, misleading both CBP and Embassy Tel Aviv consular officers. 26.(SBU) Often, these Israelis apply for a visa under the guise of going to the United States on a 2-3 week vacation (it is now rare for us to see requests for trips of longer duration) to visit family, friends, travel, etc. Tel Aviv consular officers, despite the employment of a variety of interviewing tactics, have no way of knowing which ones were specifically told by local recruiting companies to not reveal their true intention to work in the United States to them. It is known that recruiters have no interest in Israelis who do not already possess a U.S. visa as that is one of two key job requirements; the other is possession of English-language skills. After they receive their U.S. visa, the company will then furnish them with B1H3 training letters and coach them to tell CBP that they are coming for "just for training," etc. so as to facilitate their entry into the United States. 27.(SBU)To combat the B1H3 letter scam, tools we employ include: the stapling of a card onto passports of those issued B1B2 visas advising against unauthorized employment in the United States; and extensive CCD notes that include a key phrase "vacation only," trip information as presented (e.g. location and duration) and job occupation. The latter is important as those who present B1H3 letters will almost always say they have been working for a local Dead Sea company for at least a short period. If they recently applied for a visa at Tel Aviv, these applicants usually do not indicate during the interview or on the application itself that they already have been working for these local Dead Sea companies. In other words, a different employer is likely listed in the CCD. 28.(SBU)Regarding remuneration of B1H3 workers, 9 FAM 41.31 N11 says: There are cases in which aliens who qualify for H1 or H3 visas may more appropriately be classified as B-1 visa applicants in certain circumstances, e.g., a qualified H1 or H3 visa applicant coming to the United States to perform H1 services or to participate in a training program. In such a case, the applicant must not receive any salary or other remuneration from a U.S. source other than an expense allowance or other reimbursement for expenses incidental to the alien's temporary stay....it is essential that the remuneration or source of income for services performed in the United States continue to be provided by the business entity located abroad, and that the alien meets the following criteria: (1) With regard to foreign-sourced remuneration for services performed by aliens admitted under the provisions of INA 101(a)(15)(B), the Department has maintained that where a U.S. business enterprise or entity has a separate business enterprise abroad, the salary paid by such foreign entity shall not be considered as coming from a "U.S. source;" (2) In order for an employer to be considered a "foreign firm" the entity must have an office abroad and its payroll must be disbursed abroad. To qualify for a B-1 visa, the employee must customarily be employed by the foreign firm, the employing entity must pay the employee's salary, and the source of the employee's salary must be abroad; and.... Going against 9 FAM 41.31 N11.9 (2) and (3), the B1H3 "training program" in reality has these Israelis engaging in unauthorized full time employment selling Dead Sea products at mall KIOSKs across the United States. In general, they are paid in cash based upon their level of sales, which can range from USD 250 to USD 800 per week. Wire transfers from the United States to workers' Israeli accounts, payments to Israeli credit card accounts, and checks deposited to a U.S. bank account are among the other known means of payment. All of these payment methods are considered U.S. source, thus not foreign as they should be. 29.(SBU)Known B1H3 letter drafters (Israel-based) are: STS (majority user and has several TECS records), AK Global Investments and Management LLC, KIT, Gaya Inc, Global Spa LTD, Ela Marketing LLC, Tal Yosifun LTD, JNS Global Israel LTD, Sol Enterprise Israel LTD, Market Trade LTD, Mor Universal Management Consultants, and Global Market Trade LTD (formerly JG Cosmetics LTD). [NOTE: Gaya Inc and Sol Enterprise Israel LTD have residential addresses.] 30.(SBU)Known US counterparts to above Israeli comapnies: A&B United, Coral Cosmetics, E-Marketing, Enias Beauty, Everesteam, Feel Free LLC, Gill Cosmetics, Gizbo Trading, JNS Global, Lali Beauty (aka Cart Planet), Libra LLC, LMD 4 Florida, Lucidity Enterprises, Mall Security Enterprises, MDS, Micaella, Nine DEC, Sound Creation, Spa to Go (MI), Stanga and Suns Inc. 31.(SBU) H3 Statistics: Of note is Tel Aviv's dramatic drop in H3 cases between 2008 and 2009--likely due to the B1H3 letter scam and submission of I539 applications to change status to H3. H3s FY 2006: 15 H3s issued; 4 refused. (19 cases) FY 2007: 49 H3s issued; 22 refused. (71 cases) FY 2008: 47 H3s issued; 19 refused. (66 cases) FY 2009: 8 H3s issued; 4 refused. (12 cases) FY 2010 to Dec. 14: 0 H3s issued; 1 refused. (1 case) -------------- E and L Visas -------------- 32.(SBU)E visas: Shell companies have been known to be established in order to "qualify" an Israeli for E1 status. E1 visas, in general receive close scrutiny in Tel Aviv; Dead Sea-related cases, due to their non-transparent corporate structure, receive even further scrutiny. As a fraud prevention measure and, mainly because of their low volume, ConGen Jerusalem agreed to transfer their E cases for Tel Aviv to process. Of its own cases, Tel Aviv approved eight and rejected six such E1 visa cases; rejections were due to lack of qualifications. 33.(SBU)L visas: Tel Aviv recently returned to USCIS a Dead Sea company's L petition because additional information that we received revealed there was no intra-company connection between the Israeli entity and the U.S. entity other than a distributor relationship. As with E visas, Tel Aviv will be keeping a close eye on these cases. ----------------------------------- Q4 Visas for Israeli KIOSK Workers? ----------------------------------- 34.(SBU) A Dead Sea company, one that may have organized crime (OC) connections, continues to tell us they are pushing for the creation of a Q4 visa category to permit Israelis to work at U.S. KIOSKs selling Dead Sea products. FPM first heard of this idea back in the fall of 2008 from this company's owner and continues to hear about Q4 plans. The argument for the Q4 visa rests upon the "uniqueness" of having an Israeli sales force within the Dead Sea industry. Tel Aviv does not view this proposed visa category as credible, for it could be used as a way to legitimize B2 workers and continue the pattern of not being open to hiring U.S. citizens. 35.(SBU)Moreover, there is nothing intrinsic to the Dead Sea that Israelis are privy to that other people in the world cannot find out. In fact, company representatives repeatedly have stated to ARSO-I and FPM that only Israelis are capable of working for them and that they do not hire Americans because they are lazy. Their attitude has more to do with high pressure sales techniques and controlling a vulnerable work force; ARSO-I and FPM have seen these elements in these companies' instruction manuals. -------------------------------------- I275s - Dead Sea Information Goldmine -------------------------------------- 36.(SBU)Dead Sea-related denials of entry easily top Tel Aviv's list of reasons for POE turnarounds. Two hundred and sixty-one (261) such I275s have been received here since October 2007. In Jan-Nov 2009, FPM received 162 I275s, reflecting POEs' increased scrutiny of post-army Israelis--the group that is most likely to work without authorization. Since we probably do not receive every Dead Sea-related I275 from each and every POE, the total number we have likely does not represent the total number of Israelis denied entry. Newark, with 65 cases, processed the most I275s in Jan-Nov 2009; Atlanta Hartsfield and Chicago O'Hare are second and third, respectively, for the same period. The November 2009 CBP Travel Industry Bulletin spotlights Atlanta, which is one of the busiest airports in the world, and the mention of Israeli fraud on page two says something about the level of their concern regarding this issue. Previously, as described in reftel A, Israelis intending to work were advised by their companies and recruiters to avoid Atlanta. Disseminating this type of information has become more sophisticated due to online videos advising which airports to avoid, and etc. As with Atlanta, Israelis are beginning to avoid Newark. Where will they go next? 37.(SBU)To help close the communication gap, FPM has reached out to POEs that handle Israeli arrivals and shared information in the attempt to maintain an "advantage." The outreach is done via the FPM's ad-hoc Dead Sea e-mails that share trends/data and information with CBP, FDNS, ICE, USCIS and others. FPM maintains several e-distribution lists. Represented in the CBP POE list are: ATL, BOS, CHI, DET, HOU, IAD, JFK, LAX, MIA, MSP, NEW, PDX, PHI, PHX, SEA and SFO. If you would like to receive these Dead Sea e-mails, please write to vincentwm@state.gov. 38.(SBU) All 261 of our I275 cases have been analyzed extensively for intel- and data-gathering purposes, and shared internally and externally. What's noteworthy? 21-24 is the main age cluster; 57.5 percent are females and 42.5 percent males; 46 percent are from central Israel (interesting as the north and south are less well-off areas); 75.5 percent applied for B2 status upon entry; 16.9 percent presented B1H3 letters; POE denials: 52.5 percent worked on a previous trip; 31 percent intended to work if admitted to the United States; 47.9 percent were caught on the second entry attempt due to having worked on the first entry; and POE denial grounds per INA: 77.4 percent were 7A1, and 17.6 percent were 6C1 in addition to 7A1. 39.(SBU) We suspect that quite a few Israelis manage to evade CBP successfully and, for every I275er caught, there are likely several B1B2ers. Via word of mouth, the smart ones come for a short, 1-2 month stay to work, earn money and leave. They then return the following year for the holidays, which is the principal money making season. According to our CBP contacts, these individuals are much harder to catch. 40.(SBU) FPM encourages POEs to send via e-mail or snail/express mail copies of Dead Sea-related I275s for intel and analytical purposes; Please see paragraph 75 for Tel Aviv's mailing address details. ---------------------------- Validation Studies Underway ---------------------------- 41.In October 2008, Tel Aviv implemented changes in its evaluation of post-army visa applicants, and as a result, its refusal rate began to climb sharply. FPM requested an ATS/ADIS validation study of B1B2ers in April 2009. The results indicated it was too early for an informative study as many of these Israelis were still in the United States. We plan to follow up on this group at the 18 month mark; we suspect we'll see lengthy stays, numerous extensions and changes of status. Meantime, we continue to flag issued cases within this demographic by adding particular phrases into NIV case notes for additional validation studies. ------------------------------------------ Transport of Cash Connected to Dead Sea Industry ------------------------------------------ 42.(SBU) Transport of cash from the United States to Israel has long been a concern of FPM and ARSO-I as it not only implies illegal employment, but also money laundering, and thus, potential organized crime connections to the industry. Information gathered from the I275s and from CBP show that Israelis, including relatives or friends of illegal workers, have been caught outbound transporting large sums of money back to Israel. In one case, a young Israeli couple was discovered transporting over USD 26,000 for their illegal worker friends to Israel; they had lied about the amount to prevent the money's seizure. Further, ARSO-I has discovered through a source that young Israeli workers returning to Israel have been tasked with carrying back money for the company. These workers are then met by a contact in Israel; the money is collected at or near the airport and is delivered to a local company representative. 43.(SBU)At Newark, Israelis regularly have been caught by its Outbound Currency Enforcement Team (OCET). Generally, these Israelis have been in the United States for four to six months and are carrying about USD 8,000 to USD 9,800, just under the reporting limit. In addition to carrying cash for the companies, these workers also have been known to wire some of the money to Israel or have someone carry some of it home for them or buy items with their illegal earnings such as laptops, i-Phones, clothing, etc. OCET places long-term lookout on these cash-carrying individuals and reports those who admit to and/or have proof of working illegally to Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv FPM then evaluates these individuals for 214B visa revocations and adds corporate intel gleaned by OCET from these cases to the Dead Sea Excel file. Tel Aviv welcomes submissions from other OCET teams. 44.(SBU) There is a catch-22 situation in which CBP knows that Israelis had worked illegally, with or without proof of employment and/or admission of unauthorized employment. If the Israeli declares under $10,000 or over that amount--as long as they declare, they are free to return to Israel. Per Newark's OCET's experience and TECS records, Newark estimates that roughly 800 Israelis who carried $5,000 or more and stayed four to six months were either stopped, interviewed and/or had outbound examinations in CY 2009. The scale of this cash transport is not small-for just one POE: 800 Israelis multiplied by $5000 minimum, equals a lot of money--at least $4 million! --------------------------------- Dead Sea and Organized Crime (OC) --------------------------------- 45.(SBU) Organized Crime in the Dead Sea industry is a real concern. Tel Aviv has consistently received information that large sums of money are allegedly being laundered and transported between the United States and Israel. Due to the amount of money being laundered and transported, Tel Aviv has long suspected a link between the Dead Sea industry and OC. In early December, FPU received an e-mail from an informant who said he had information alleging that a key Dead Sea company is connected to OC. ARSO-I and FPU subsequently interviewed this informant; the ARSO-I's report of this interview states: "The SUBJECT stated that s/he is in possession of computer disks with all of this company's accounts, money totals, smuggled bulk cash from the United States to Israel and has a complete understanding of the alleged illegal activities to include the employing of illegal workers, suspected drug smuggling, money laundering, intimidation, threats, extortion, and tax evasion. The SUBJECT also claimed that this company is allegedly owned by a major organized crime family in Israel that has threatened SUBJECT'S life, extorted money from SUBJECT, and has sent people to physically assault SUBJECT." Due to the ongoing criminal investigation in the United States, no additional details can be released at this time. 46.(SBU)Further adding credibility to our suspicions, is an arrest case from this past summer in Japan where KIOSKs run by young Israelis were allegedly being used by an OC organization to launder its drug money and real estate investment deals. As noted above, some Dead Sea companies have real estate and investment companies as part of their overall structure. 47.(SBU)Shell and holding companies are all part of the industry's corporate strategy, designed mainly to distance themselves from the illegal workers at the KIOSKs. To exemplify, one Dead Sea holding company has 60+ companies under it. Now, assume that one of those 60+ companies has a contract with another company and that other company then hires the illegal workers. This scenario is quite common, complicating our efforts to combat and uncover Dead Sea fraud. Furthermore, once a company is found to be employing illegal workers it merely changes its name or creates a new owner for a shell company and applies for H2B petitions. As mentioned earlier, there are a handful of attorneys who have been filing the majority of the Dead Sea industry's petitions and I539s. They appear to be passionate lobbyists for these new companies--almost as if there had been a previous working relationship (as in, with the "old" company). 48.(SBU) Sometimes, key Dead Sea players have been "caught-out" by their own non-transparent corporate structures. Recently, Tel Aviv received an e-mail complaint from one of the known Dead Sea lawyers that also included the CEO's angry e-mail to that lawyer. Problem: that CEO had, in theory, nothing to do with the petitioning company as he was the CEO of a different company. FPM investigated and discovered that the CEO's company sub-leases the KIOSKs to the petitioning company. Furthermore, the CEO's company has a TECS record that says it doesn't exist. 49.(SBU) As a side note: Tel Aviv FPU has a large and growing list of known OC figures identified through open source materials and confirmed by ARSO-I through Israeli Law Enforcement sources. Tel Aviv FPU and ARSO-I are working with the Legal Attach on possible strategies to combat OC in conjunction with FPU's revocation of visas for convicted OC members. ---------------------------------- Dead Sea Industry and Real Estate ---------------------------------- 50.(SBU)Increasingly, we are seeing signs of involvement in real estate by many of the key Dead Sea players. One example is the recruiter mentioned in the 6E deterrent section. In addition, our ARSO-I recently interviewed someone with extensive knowledge of a particular Dead Sea company; this person alleged that money laundering is occurring through the real estate arms of these companies. The real estate arms of these companies are also involved in employing young Israelis to work for them in violation of their visa status. Further, substantiating this trend, ARSO-I reported that his source stated that the real estate business was becoming as important as the KIOSKs. 51.(SBU) Another aspect of the real estate issue is these companies' provision of housing for their workers, whether legal or not. Industry-wide, there are a large number of apartments and, increasingly, houses, located near the malls where they work. Placing at least four or more workers in a two bedroom place and charging each person USD 500 a month has made housing another potential money-maker. As the addresses of these apartments/houses may indicate intent to work, Tel Aviv FPM has been tracking them in an Excel document that contains comprehensive information on the Dead Sea industry. Addresses are gleaned from I275s, H2B DS 156s, and received from other inter-agency sources. --------------- Made in Israel? --------------- 52.(SBU)Given the shrinking Dead Sea, labor/shipping costs and the increasing volume of products being sold, Tel Aviv FPM and ARSO-I suspect that some of these "made in Israel" cosmetic and skincare item are actually made elsewhere. Supporting this is ARSO-I's development of a source who informed him that one of the larger corporate groups was manufacturing soaps in the United States using possible illegal workers from Central America and then selling the product as from the Dead Sea, i.e. made in Israel. Another likely source is China, which has both "dead seas" and cheap labor. Last but not least, ICE Rome reported to ARSO-I and Tel Aviv that they suspect these companies may be importing soaps and creams in bulk to Israel and labeling them here before shipping to the United States using Israel's "most favored trading nation" status to save money. -------------------------- Interagency Success Story -------------------------- 53.(SBU) In November, Houston's DBTF executed search warrants on a particular Dead Sea company. The result: ten Israelis were arrested for working on B2 visas; numerous boxes of evidence were seized along with USD 70,000. The company's H2B contract, translated by Tel Aviv FPU at the DBTF's request, was found to violate DOL and USCIS provisions. ARSO-I and FPU have assisted DBTF with identifying people, detailing connections between individuals/companies and provided requested information whenever possible. 54.(SBU)It is now rumored that the company being investigated by DBTF Houston has shuttered operations; Tel Aviv continues to monitor chat rooms and message boards for Dead Sea workers. Indications are that this company's B1B2ers already have been moved to other areas and new companies (including shells) have been created to fill this corporate gap. Moreover, Tel Aviv discovered that this Houston-based company has very close ties to another Dead Sea operation in Arizona. ARSO-I has passed information to DBTF Houston as part of their ongoing investigation. 55.(SBU)ARSO-I, ICE Rome and Tel Aviv have consistently waged an information campaign to enlist other regulatory and law enforcement entities to investigate this seemingly fraud-riddled industry on a nation-wide basis. However, given the lack of interest in a national investigation, ARSO-I and Tel Aviv highly recommend that DBTFs nation-wide consider duplicating the Houston-based DBTF's recent successful efforts. 56.(SBU) Tel Aviv believes that interagency efforts are crucial to combating and preventing Dead Sea Fraud. FPM has developed a network of working contacts across the United States with various agencies such as CBP, ICE, FDNS and USCIS. Tel Aviv greatly appreciates CBP's inclusion of its fraud prevention efforts in their official publications such as the New York/Newark Tactical Analytical Unit (TAU) Weekly Intelligence Brief and the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination's Weekly Intelligence Notes. As one prong of a multi-faceted fraud situation, our continued inter-agency sharing of information, trends and analyses have and will continue to tighten the noose on Israelis working illegally. Complementing the FPM's efforts is the ARSO-I's ongoing communications with Law Enforcement entities to facilitate information-sharing and to track a growing number of arrested Israelis and Dead Sea companies under investigation. ----------------------------------------- 6C and 6E Ineffective: Stronger Deterrents Needed ----------------------------------------- 57. (SBU) 9 FAM 40.65 INA 212(A)(6)(E) (6)Illegal entrants and immigration violators. (E) Smugglers. (i) In general.-Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible. Per 9 FAM 40.65 N5, 6E could be incurred for offering an alien a job under circumstances where it is clear that the alien will not enter the United States legally in order to accept employment. 58.(SBU)Post is looking into either P6E- or 6E-ing known Israeli recruiters of B2 workers. One recruiter recently applied for a visa, saying that he was in real estate and no longer in the Dead Sea business. The applicant, because of his prior Dead Sea history, was vetted more closely by FPU. FPU discovered that he had recruited B2 workers and was still doing so; a second interview by the ARSO-I and FPU resulted in a 6E finding. Using the 6E provision can deter recruiters from traveling to the United States, however they would still be free to recruit B2 workers in Israel and online. 59.(SBU)Per the above I-275 analyses, almost 18 percent of those denied entry are found ineligible under 6C1. Israelis 6C1'd tend to be recent cases in which they obtained a visa from Tel Aviv telling one story (vacation) to the interviewing officer and another story (work) to CBP officers--misrepresentation. Post has seen cases in which CBP could have and, for their own reasons, did not do so. Post is unable to make 6C1 findings unless the applicant was determined to have cut off a line of questioning with a material fact-in reality, this determination is made after the visa's issuance. Due to Tel Aviv's lack of information as to when B1B2ers start work, it is difficult to apply the 30/60 day rule per 9FAM 40.63 N4.7-1 and 9FAM 40.63 N4.7-2. It is also not yet clear whether 6C1 will be a strong deterrent as most of those recently denied entry have been barred for at least five years. After five years, they'll certainly learn first-hand the severity of the lifetime consequences of their 6C1 ineligibility when they apply for a new visa. -------------------------------------- New, Old Deterrent: Limit B1B2 Validity? -------------------------------------- 60.(SBU)The essence of Tel Aviv's 214b problem is not whether the applicant will return, but whether the applicant will abide by the terms of his/her B1B2 visa. This cable presents strong evidence that many post-Army Israelis violate the terms of their visas. As this practice is culturally acceptable, Tel Aviv thus far has been unable to determine a pattern that would help interviewing officers identify mala-fide applications. Several years ago, Tel Aviv limited visas issued to middle- and high-school aged students to the approximate end of their military service so as to prompt a look at their post-army situations. Per CA's request this practice stopped. Being able to review the applications of Israelis who previously received limited visas has been helpful in identifying patterns and in collecting crucial information about illegal recruitment and work practices. This, combined with the large number of post-army Israelis who work illegally on their B1B2 visas, has led Tel Aviv to re-examine the efficacy of limiting young Israelis' visas, with a focus on those who recently finished their military service. We look forward to a dialogue with CA on this issue. 61.(SBU)There are a variety of reasons described in this cable for Tel Aviv to re-consider limiting visas of those in the post-military service age group. Of note is that, while in the military, Israelis must obtain special permission to vacation abroad and return to military service or face being charged as a deserter. And for post-army Israelis, given the widespread and culturally accepted intentions to work illegally, the idea would be to limit post-army issued visas to one- or multiple- entry for one year (un-annotated), sharply reducing the time and opportunities to work illegally. This one year visa limitation idea would also give us more information about their actual travel versus their stated plans, helping us better identify mala-fide first time applicants. It should be noted that Tel Aviv's interviewing officers have been consciously evaluating each applicant as an individual and trying not to discriminate against a broad age-group category. Frustratingly, we regularly receive reports on Israelis known to be working who appeared to be solid visa issuance cases during their interviews, which were based on the best available information regarding their ties. --------------------------------------- Visa Waiver Program (VWP) Implications --------------------------------------- 62.(SBU) While security and biometric requirements are Israel's key hurdles to joining the VWP, it now has the added complication of being over the three percent refusal rate threshold due to post-army Israelis' tendency to abuse their visas. Predictably, dual national Israeli workers with VWP country passports have bypassed Tel Aviv and entered the United States on their VWP passports. Tel Aviv's adjusted refusal rate for host country nationals for B1B2 visas increased from 1.27 percent in FY 2007 to 4.38 percent in FY 2009. It appears this rate will climb further; for FY 2010, as of December 30, it was 5.91 percent. Worldwide, the refusal rate for all Israelis is higher yet. Although our refusal rate continues to rise, we are still taking great pains to interview each applicant as individual cases. -------------------------------------------- Annotations as a Fraud Prevention Tool: Israelis Prove to be Clever and Adaptable -------------------------------------------- 63.(SBU)As an innovative fraud prevention tool, Tel Aviv, in consultation with 9FAM 41.113 PN6, 9FAM 41.31 N19 and CBP officers, began adding a particular, positive annotation on some full-validity B1B2 visas issued to those within this problematic demographic. Due to a lack of "tells," Tel Aviv has not been able to distinguish definitively between those who intend to abuse their visas by working illegally from those who do not; as mentioned above, recruiters are coaching applicants on what to do/say in their interviews. Our annotations were intended to give CBP officers, who are able to talk to our applicants several weeks/months post-interview, an opportunity to prevent B1B2 visa abuse. All applicants in this age group are potentially "at risk" for recruitment, especially after being granted B1B2 visas; because of this risk, CBP officers have told FPM that they appreciate our use of such annotations. It should be pointed out that only a minority of visas for this demographic were annotated. 64. (SBU) The first annotation employed was "First Trip: travelling to XYZ with XYZ relative." This proved ineffective, for Israelis learned to create stories to cover discrepancies with the annotation and it applied only to the first trip. To replace this, the more generic "B2 CCD" annotation informed CBP that the Israeli has sufficient ties to qualify for visa and told us their trip's intent was B2 purposes, tourism. At any rate, clever Israelis figured out that B2 CCD meant they needed to be consistent with the false tourism story sold to Tel Aviv with CBP. Given CA's aversion to annotations, we have ceased the use of B2 CCD annotations. 65.(SBU) Predictably, Israelis are chatting online at sites devoted to working in the United States about perceived patterns of Tel Aviv's actions, including annotations. While reviewing "Forums for Job Advertisements in the U.S.," FPU discovered this posting: "I have an important question: I got a visa in the mail for 10 years and the visa was annotated 1st trip with parents. I am really not planning on traveling with my parents. Can anyone help? Tell me what can I do?" The response was: "you have been busted...this is a new policy that the Embassy has taken in order to make sure no one fools them. Applicants say they are traveling with parents in order to maximize their chances in getting a visa. No way in getting around this cause it appears in their computers. Best idea for you is to ask your mother if she wants to join you in this trip." ------------------------------------ Facebook as a Fraud Prevention Tool ------------------------------------ 66.(SBU)The Internet has "gifted" us with new fraud tools for our toolbox. Facebook (FB) is a prime example as we use it in many ways. 67.(SBU) Confirming Identities and/or Affiliations (assumes public access): Not surprisingly, Dead Sea-related FB pages exist-most are in Hebrew: two examples are "Carts in San Diego" and "Dead Sea in Miami." FPU checks which "location" or "network" with which the person in question might be associated. If an applicant signed up for the Houston network (or other area known for Dead Sea workers), it raises a red flag that they should be interviewed more thoroughly as to the trip's true purpose. FPU also trawls through FB's Dead Sea-related groups to spot-check members or "fans" of a particular page against the CCD to see what type of visa, if any, they received. Likewise, surfing through an applicant's list of "friends" for familiar Dead Sea names and/or for that person's U.S. contact's listing as a "friend" can be fruitful. These searches help determine whether or not the applicant or the applicant's contacts are connected to Dead Sea-related activities. 68.(SBU) FB pages have helped official investigations, too. At the request of ICE, Tel Aviv, armed with some bio data, was able to verify the identity of a person who was working at a KIOSK by finding that person's FB page photo and comparing it to his/her CCD photo. 69.(SBU) Recruiters and job listings: FB has pages for Dead Sea job listings and one such site is "Nova USA." To investigate, the FPU visits that page and looks at the names of the administrators and the contact e-mail addresses for job listings (which can lead us to recruiters) and then checks the information against the CCD via a text search. If there are "hits," then the information within these cases, such as other e-mail addresses are text searched to see where the information trail leads. Ultimately, all key information is watch-phrased. ------------------------------------ Outreach as a Fraud Prevention Tool ------------------------------------ 70.(SBU)In September, Tel Aviv publicly launched a consular video, "Illegal Work in the U.S.: Price is Too High" (usembassy-israel.org.il/consular/niv/index.a spx). This video has been viewed on the Embassy's You-Tube channel over 5,700 times, easily making it Tel Aviv's most popular one. In addition to also posting it on the consular section's FB page, the video is being played in the visa waiting room in a loop, along with a video that explains the application process. Some Israelis who have been denied entry told CBP that they had seen the video while in the waiting room and that they still intended to work despite its warnings! 71.(SBU)The video's debut launched an active, ongoing campaign by FPU to educate post-army Israelis about how to work legally in the United States. The video was publicized on national radio, leading to a spate of national media articles on Israelis working in the United States. In November, Channel 2, a key TV channel, picked up on this issue and invited two Israelis who had been denied entry to tell their stories in a live, five minute segment. The moral: the consequences (barred from entering the United States for at least five years) are not worth the illegal work. Right after their TV segment aired, FPU and ARSO-I met with one of these two Israelis. This meeting was an eye-opener, for we learned more about how young Israelis lie in their visa interviews. FPU is currently scheduling additional individual meetings with I275ers to glean more information on how they succeeded in obtaining B1B2s when their true intent was to work. As a counterfoil to meetings with I275ers, FPU has requested through ARSO-I to meet with several Embassy local guard force (LGF) staff, who also belong to this problematic age group; the RSO's office is currently reviewing this request. 72.(SBU)Post has had positive results from its campaign against illegal work. FPU has received e-mails from numerous Israelis inquiring as to whether the work opportunities that they have been given are legal or not; most have not been. Also, we have received e-mail from informants, one of whom may crack a high-profile Dead Sea company wide open. Still others have e-mailed to let us know they had quit their H2B jobs as they either didn't like the work or suspected the employer was not legitimate. ARSO-I and FPU have followed up on every email and contact in the attempt to glean as much information as possible from those actually recruited by or working for these companies. 73.(SBU)Phase II of the campaign is about to commence. Included in this phase is the production of a second video. Instead of having the Embassy produce, it will be produced by a group of students from a noted Israeli film school. These students are in the same age demographic as Dead Sea workers, and, because of this, we hope this video will resonate even more strongly with post-army Israelis. The November and December 2009 arrests of Israelis working at KIOSKs in Houston and Seattle also will reinforce the video's message. 74.(SBU) As in phase I, Tel Aviv continues to work with our Public Diplomacy colleagues to alert Israelis to the consequences of working illegally via mainstream media outreach. Thus far, several articles have been published and received wide distribution. Previously, journalists from papers such as the Wall Street Journal have reported on this industry (and quoted illegal Israelis); additional, mass-audience articles should also help push this campaign forward. -------------------------------------- New Mailing Address for Official Mail -------------------------------------- 75.(SBU) The Department of State and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) changed the unclassified Diplomatic Pouch regulations for sending and receiving official mail. No longer are we to use the Diplomatic Post Office (DPO/APO) for sending and receiving official mail. All official mail sent to Tel Aviv should use this Diplomatic Pouch address: Wendy Vincent, Fraud Prevention Manager Consular Section 9700 Tel Aviv Place Department of State Washington, DC 20521-9700 For security reasons, please do not write "U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv." For those who prefer to use express mail: Wendy Vincent, CONS 71 Hayarkon Street Tel Aviv, Israel 63903 ----------- Conclusion ----------- 76.(SBU) The Dead Sea industry is continually adapting to new economic opportunities in addition to playing their corporate "games." Prior to the establishment of the Dead Sea industry, Israelis were known to work illegally for moving companies. Though not as widespread as the Dead Sea industry, as mentioned in reftel A, B1B2 locksmiths also are of concern. Tel Aviv's dedicated, motivated fraud team and ARSO-I are working hard to stay on top of fraud trends--it is not easy. Tel Aviv greatly appreciates its close ties with numerous DHS agencies and officers--together we form part of the "global" effort to combat fraud within this fraud-riddled industry. As part of these closer ties, we thank those CBP and USCIS officers who contributed important text and statistics to this cable. For future fraud efforts on this issue, Tel Aviv looks forward to working with additional partners from the law enforcement community. 77.(SBU)Tel Aviv's FPM, Wendy Vincent, looks forward to hearing from others who have been working on Dead Sea industry fraud and is willing to share information accordingly. As mentioned above, she maintains a distribution list for Tel Aviv's ad-hoc e-mails on Dead Sea trends, issues and data updates to her extensive Excel document on the Dead Sea industry. Should you wish to join this e-distribution list or establish contact with Tel Aviv, please e-m |
| HEADER | VZCZCXYZ0008 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHTV #0140/01 0250537 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 250537Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5076 INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8617 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3571 RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC XTAGS: XTAGCVIS, XTAGASEC, XTAGKFRD, XTAGKCRM, XTAGCMGT, XTAGPINR, XTAGIS XDEST_09TELAVIV423 |
| TAGS | |
| ADDED | 2011-08-24 01:00:00 |
| STAMP | 2011-08-24 22:59:11 |
| VOTE_POINTS | 0 |
| VOTE_COUNT | 0 |
| VOTE_RATING | 0 |
| PRIORITY | RR |
| TWEETS | 0 |
| MANUAL | N |
| SITELINK | |
| ISNEW | Y |
| FINGERPRINT1 |
