Sunday, December 18, 2005

Mossad Aman The Truth Behind The Israeli Secret Services.

The Truth Behind The Israeli Secret Services.

"Y'all gotta start thinking on a different level- like the CIA does. We're
through the looking glass. Here white is black and black is white."

THE TRUTH is that the atrocities are a direct result of the war plan, the 1982 invasion plan of IDF. Operations SPARK and IRON BRAIN....This reflects the personality of Ariel SHARON– a man whose way of thinking and actions, throughout his adult life, are clear evidence of what is called “moral insanity”, a sociopathic disorder...."
Almost all the Western media repeated the official Israeli propaganda line. They entirely ignored the Lebanese side of the story, and took for fact all the "official" Israeli LIARS stories, which were manufactured for Propaganda purposes.


Perception is paramount to reality in the Middle East. Most of
the known, and some of the written, history is based on myths and half
truths. All parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the inter-Arab
conflicts, have engaged in spreading lies and dis-information, and
unfortunately most of these stick to the minds of the public. The party that
has most benefited from and made use of this fact has been, and still is,
Israel. It has been the main and most pervasive purveyor of lies for many
reasons, but the main one has been its strong influence, and sometimes its
actual control, of most main media in the west. Many Arabs do not trust
their own government controlled media, and often turn to foreign sources,
like the BBC World service and CNN, to get their information. Israel has
been extremely active since its inception and mostly since the 1967 war in
spreading the lies about its own prowess vis-�-vis the Arabs. One of the
most effective media campaigns has been the one to portray the Israeli
secret service, especially the Mossad, as a heroic group of dedicated and
patriotic men who are in direct war with the Arab hordes and international
terrorists. Most of the now-famous operations, like the Adolf Eichman
abduction in 1960, have been translated into best-selling books and
box-office hits at the cinema (Black and Morris, 501).

The truth behind the Mossad and other Israeli secret services is far more
insidious and unethical and it is a catalogue of crime, of murder,
internationally illegal acts, intra-organizational conflict, and inept
handling of sensitive operations. We will see evidence of this, particularly
the role of these services in the 1982 Invasion and in particular with the
Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, as well as the eventual Intelligence failure in
Lebanon. Then we will work on explaining the functions of the different
organizations, showing that not only can we expose them, but that it's
possible to counter them successfully.

The Role and Function of the Agencies

Although the Mossad has almost exclusively been the focus of the
world media, Israel actually has three main security services (Mossad, Shin
Bet, and AMAN), as well as one minor service (LAKAM), and one agency (AL),
whose existence is unconfirmed but highly plausible. The three agencies grew
out of the pre-1948 security organs that were attached to the main Zionist
organizations like the HAGANAH. Many recruits to the post-1948 security
services, were also recruited from the intelligence organs attached to the
other terrorist groups such as the Irgun and the Stern. The latter group
contained very competent operatives who made the transition from being
terrorists to being intelligence operatives (Raviv and Melman, 228)). They
were highly effective against the British Mandate forces, as they would be
later with their Arab foes. Secret work, mainly deception and murder, was
part and parcel of the general Zionist ideology, and it was a necessity
according to Ben-Gurion, for the service of the "Star of David" flag. Unlike
the CIA, which was established after the Communist menace became dangerous,
the Zionist leaders created the Israeli security agencies to pre-empt any
acts of the Arab foes. The Israeli security agencies were diabolically
ingenious until the Lebanese fiasco which began in 1982 and lasted until
2000. The intelligence failure in Lebanon, despite it being the most
intricate and confident of all covert operations, ended in disaster for
Israel, including the involvement in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre. This
is the reason why we will focus on this particular event after explaining
who these agencies truly are.

1- Mossad: (Hebrew:
HaMossad LeModi'in U'Letfkidm Meyuhadim. English: Institute for Intelligence
and Special Duties). Established in March, 1950. Dedicated to the gathering
of intelligence outside of Israel, preparing the target area for covert
special operations, running agents, monitoring the activities of the enemy
embassies and offices of enemy organizations, surveillance of anti-Semitism
(individuals or organizations), and spreading dis-information about the
enemy in the media.
(Mentioned 78 times in Kahan)

2- AMAN: (Hebrew:
Agaf Modi'in. English: IDF Intelligence Branch) Established in December
1953. Dedicated to the gathering of specifically military data, monitoring
enemy communication, analysis of satellite imagery, and running covert
special units and operations. (Mentioned 104 times in

3- Shin Bet, or
Shabak: (Hebrew: Sherut Habitachim Haklali. English: General Security
Services). Established in June 1948. Dedicated to the internal security of
the Israel and all occupied territories, recruiting informers and agents
among the enemy populations, interrogation coupled with psychological and
physical pressure on suspects i.e. torture, and the occasional
extra-judicial execution. (Mentioned 8 times in

4- LAKAM: (Hebrew:
Lishka le Kishrei Mada. English: Scientific Affairs Liaison Bureau).
Established in 1957. A covert unit of the Israeli Defense Ministry.
Initially dedicated to the collection of info leading to the building of the
Atom bomb, obtaining blueprints for advanced military hardware, and running
overseas covert scientific operations in friendly countries. Officially
disbanded in 1986.

5- AI: (Hebrew for
Above). This is a highly secretive autonomous division of the Mossad. They
work under deep cover in the USA, without knowledge or approval of the US
government, and some times against its interests. They mainly spy on Arab
and other embassies, but sometimes they run operations against the US
government, like the Jonathan Pollard scandal in late 1985.*

The Secret Services Vs. The Arab World

Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli Security Services were involved
in hostile covert activities against the neighboring Arab states as well as
others who were of the leftist persuasion (Nasserist, Baathist, Communist,
and Socialist). As for the Arab regimes that were of Western persuasion,
such as Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, the Israelis relied on
their American and French connections to obtain intelligence and maintain
indirect political contacts. The majority of operations were successful due
to the atmosphere of hostility and mistrust due to the Arab Cold war between
leftist and conservative regimes. Nevertheless, the main targets were the
neighboring states of Egypt and Syria.

The Mossad in particular succeeded in placing deep cover Israeli agents, or
spies in layman terms, who managed to obtain highly classified and sensitive
political and military intelligence. The most infamous of these agents were
Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt and Eli Cohen in Syria. Both spies who were active in
the 1960's, provided invaluable information that was vital in Israel's
victory in 1967 (Raviv and Melman, 143). Another highly successful operation
was the defection of an Iraqi air force pilot with his MIG-21 in August
1966, which again was vital for Israel's "pre-emptive" strike a year later
(Black and Morris, 208). The MIG-21 was the most lethal of the Soviet
fighters at that time and its secrets were unknown to the US, and NATO until
Israel gave them the blueprints. This coup, along with some secrets obtained
from the Soviet Bloc, raised the myth of the Israeli Secret Services in the

Nevertheless, the 1967 victory was the peak of Israeli achievements. After
1967, the whole picture in the region changed and a new threat was born.
That threat was called "Terrorism", and this threat became and still is the
bane of the Zionist military-intelligence machine. The Israelis had always
dealt with cross-border infiltrations from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan since
1948. The difference after 1967 was that the cross border attacks were not
sponsored by the Arab regimes but by independent groups, mostly under the
umbrella of the PLO. Prior to 1967, it was the Syrian and Egyptian borders
that were the most threatening, but after 1967 the attacks came from Jordan
and Lebanon. After the PLO was evacuated from Jordan in 1970, Lebanon became
the obsession of the Zionist decision-makers. So much that when Egypt and
Syria launched their brilliant and successful offensive in October 6 1973,
the IDF's AMAN and the Mossad were caught with their pants down in what was
known as the Mehdal, the Hebrew word for blunder (Black and Morris, 290).
Nevertheless, the "Terrorism Complex" still obsessed the Israeli
decision-makers. They retaliated against targets both in the Middle East and
in the West, and in particular against Lebanon.* When Menachem Begin, a
wanted terrorist himself, got to power in 1977, Israel decided to find a
solution to the "Palestinian Terrorist" problem once and for all. In his
cabinet he had a former soldier who thought he had the solution. That man
was called Ariel Sharon.

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Lebanon has always been a target of attention for the Israeli secret
services since the 1948 War, although since it was not an adversary like
Egypt or Syria, it didn't get much attention. All that changed after the
1967 War, and intensified after the PLO moved from Jordan to Lebanon in
1970. From this point on, Lebanon was the focus of the Israeli secret
services (AMAN, Shin Bet, and the Mossad), who reallocated some of the
intelligence assets it had previously reserved to Egypt after the peace
talks began between Sadat and Begin in the late 1970's.

Once the Lebanese Civil War began, and a clear power vacuum appeared in
South Lebanon, where only the PLO had any nominal authority. Throughout the
mostly Shiite and Christian villages of South Lebanon, however, residents
were disenchanted with the PLO rule. As a matter of fact, Major Saad Haddad
was sent to the area to re-establish the Beirut government authority in the
area. When the 1975 breakdown of law and order occurred in Central Lebanon
occurred, none of the 3 intelligence agencies had any real assets to
activate in Lebanon (Black and Morris, 364). In terms of the very factional
and brutal nature of the Lebanese Civil War, it presented them with numerous
tempting opportunities equaled by the numerous dangerous risks. Unlike the
previous situations, the Israeli Intelligence Services were presented with
an unprecedented situation for which they had no prepared strategies.

As a result, none of the 3 intelligence agencies had any real plans to deal
with Lebanon.* Nevertheless, in 1975, the possibilities seemed endless and
infinitely more benign. In that relatively more relaxed atmosphere, the
Israeli government of PM Rabin initiated the 'Good Fence" policy, in which
then residents of (preferably Christian) villages were given access to jobs
and medical care in the Galilee. (O'balance, 65) Using tactics that they
perfected in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Intelligence agencies,
and specifically the Shin Bet, manipulated this seemingly benevolent policy
as a backdoor to Lebanon and a fertile recruitment ground to recruit
informers and agents (Black and Morris, 399). As 1978 approached, though,
the Mossad was focused on the Phalange connection, and intelligence in the
South was primarily run by the Shin Bet and AMAN, who began to have regular
meetings in Northern Command to run the Lebanese operations (Black and
Morris, 367).

The operations in Lebanon were of two tiers; One, were the operations that
were dedicated to obtaining information on the Palestinian organizations
that were based in Lebanon. This information was used for the assassination
operations in the pre-1978 period. An example of such operations occurred on
the 9th of April 1973, when 30 Israeli commandos landed at El-Ramleh
El-Beidah in Beirut, led by Ehud Barak, and conducted a three pronged attack
killing an unspecified number of Palestinian Fedayeen, including 3 major
DFLP leaders, and demolishing a PLO military facility (Katz, 50).
Intelligence was used even more ruthlessly in the Invasions of 1978 and
1982. The operations were mainly focused on locating the leaders and
commanders of the various Palestinian organizations, the counting and
locating of hardware, and to recruit or coerce people into acting as agents
or informers. The latter task was vital in the relatively easy task of
occupying of the refugee camps in the South. Many Palestinian witnesses we
met in the South have all emphasized the role of the informers in the
detection, arrest, and maybe even the execution or disappearance of
prisoners. The Shin Bet, or the General Security Service as it is officially
known, which is responsible for the security of the state of Israel [48
Lands] and all occupied territories, worked feverishly between 1978-1982 to
use the occupied Southern areas as a nest of agents and informers to be used
against the Palestinian organizations that were based in the refugee camps
in the South (Randal, 219). In a little publicized incident in South
Lebanon, the Israeli security forces oversaw a massacre by the FLA in the
village of Khiam in March 1978 after the IDF completed its occupation of
South Lebanon (Fisk, 137). This coincided with the preparations for the
(Peace For Galilee) Invasion by the AMAN, the intelligence arm of the IDF
who were using information from the Shin Bet's informants, as well as
reconnaissance flights by the IAF, to locate the targets for the Invasion.

The second tier was the initiation of contacts with Lebanese parties of all
sects, although they found the Christians more responsive, although mostly
reluctant, trying to find a fifth column within the cauldron of the civil
war that began in 1975. From an early stage, the three main services
differed in their (Lebanon Strategy). The AMAN, and later the Shin Bet,
favored a concentration on the South to clearly focus on the security of
Israel's northern borders. It was these two parties that worked together on
the establishment of Saad Haddad's renegade unit as a pro-Israeli proxy
militia in the South in 1978.

The Mossad were more concentrated on recruiting "allies" in the ranks of the
Maronite militias, especially the Phalangists and their leader Bashir
Jemayel, who were on the brink of defeat in the first year of the Lebanese
Civil War. Even after the Syrians intervened to rescue the Christians, the
Mossad maintained their contacts with the Maronite militia leaders. The
initiation of contact with the Israelis was not done by the Phalange,
however, but by Camille Chamoun's son, Danny. On September 1975 in Paris,
and via a Mossad Station in Paris, Danny Chamoun, son of former president
and leader of the Tigers Militia approached the Israeli Government for
assistance (Black+ Morris, 365). Qualitatively, the Chamoun militia was
better in terms of leadership morale and desire for an alliance with Israel.
Quantitatively, The Phalangists had the advantage of numbers. Eventually,
Bashir used his numerical superiority to exterminate his rivals in the
pro-Syrian Franjieh militia. On the 13th of May 1978 in Ehden (Southeast of
Tripoli), Phalangist militia men, under orders from Bashir Jemayel and
commanded by Samir Geagea, kill Tony Franjieh, who was the son of the former
president and the leader of the pro-Syrian Maronite faction, Sulieman
Franjieh. The Phalangists killed Tony, his wife and his daughter as well as
nearly 30 of his loyalists. (O'Ballance, 79) Not satisfied with slaying his
Maronite rivals, Bashir went on to slay his allies. On the 7th of July 1980
in Safra Resort near Jounieh, Phalangist militiamen launched a wide-scale
attack against Chamoun's Tigers. The battle ended with nearly 80 deaths on
both sides, including many innocent bystanders. Danny Chamoun, the deposed
leader of the Tigers, would later claim and insist that Bashir Jemayel was
encouraged to carry out this putsch by Israeli C-o-S Eitan (Schiff and Ya'ari,
29). By the beginning of 1982, Bashir had become the commander of the now
united Maronite militias, under the name of the Lebanese Forces (LF), who
were armed and trained by Israel. This sheer brutality and cold-bloodedness
endeared Bashir to the Israeli government, the IDF and the 3 agencies. In
fact after Sharon became defense minister after August 1981, he and Bashir
became good friends.

Underneath the whole amicability, there was a diversion in what was to
become of the Palestinians in Lebanon in the eyes of the LF and the IDF. The
LF held the banner of expelling the Palestinians from Lebanon, but in
reality the LF would have settled for the expulsion of the Palestinians from
Central Lebanon, especially Beirut. The IDF also wanted the PLO gone and the
Palestinian refugees moved to Jordan but it also would have settled for the
removal of the Palestinian presence from South Lebanon. In the end, the
arrogance and brutality of the two strongmen, Sharon and Bashir, would guide
them to a radical and final solution to the Palestinian problem in Lebanon:

In Central Lebanon, the LF had only one real adversary, the PLO, who
happened to be the sworn enemy of Israel, standing in the way of Maronite
controlled Lebanon. Syria was another enemy but Bashir was not going to
confront it on his own. So encouraged by the Mossad station chief in
Jounieh, Bashir wanted to provoke the Syrian Army into an attack on the
Maronites. During the election campaign, and after his victory, PM Begin
made many grandiose statements about preventing the "genocide of the
Christians" in Lebanon. (Morris, 504-505) The Israeli Government needed a
pretext to intervene in Lebanon and prompted Bashir to provide them with
one. The Ehden Massacre of one of Syria's primary allies in Lebanon was such
a provocation but the Syrians refused to fall in the trap. Bashir knew that
he needed a stronger incident to get the Syrians to attack the LF positions
to provide a pretext for the IDF to attack. Thus on the 1st of April in
1981, LF units attack and occupy Zahle, the strategic town on the
Beirut-Damascus Highway in the Bekaa Valley, provoking a massive response
from the Syrian Army. (Schiff +Ya'ari, 32)

On the 28th of April in 1981, the Israeli Cabinet met to discuss the Zahle
Crisis. PM Begin and C-o-S Eitan called for IAF strikes against Syrian
targets in and around Zahle. The majority of the cabinet and the Mossad
Director, Yitzhak Hofi opposed the idea. The loudest opposition came from
Saguy, AMAN Commander, who openly accused Eitan of encouraging Bashir to
incite the Zahle Crisis to give the IDF justification to intervene. Both
Hofi and Saguy suspected that Eitan was encouraging Bashir to pick a fight
with the Syrians in order to drag Israel into the Lebanese conflict (Schiff
+Ya'ari, 33). They were right. C-o-S Eitan, in collusion with PM Begin, left
the meeting to order the shooting down by of two Syrian helicopters, and
claimed when he returned to the meeting that the IAF has shot down "two
assault gunships". The truth was that the IAF had shot down 2 unarmed troop
carriers. Saguy predicted that Syrian President Assad will take measures
that can only threaten the IAF's air supremacy over Lebanese Skies. (Schiff
+Ya'ari, 33-34) Sure enough the next day the Syrians introduced 4 (SAM-6)
batteries to the Bekaa. On the 30th of April in 1981, PM Begin and C-o-S
Eitan ordered an IAF attack against the Syrian SAM's, but poor weather
prevented the attack. US mediation eventually defused the situation, but in
favor of Syria, which kept its SAM's in Lebanon and defeated the LF in
Zahle. (Morris, 506) This failure was followed by another attempt at
provoking the Syrians. On the 14th of December 1981, PM Begin announced the
annexation of the Golan Heights, Syrian territory that has been occupied
since 1967. Syria sensibly refused to respond to this blatant provocation.
(To Win or to Die, 265)

By the beginning of 1982, the 3 Agencies were hard at work planning the
Invasion of Lebanon, and the plans included 3 main elements: destruction of
the PLO infrastructure, the expulsion of the Syrian forces, and the
promotion of LF dominance of Lebanon. On the second week of January 1982, DM
Sharon led a large entourage on tour of Central Lebanon, including Beirut.
He met with Bashir Jemayel, who expressed support for the invasion but
refused to meet any of Sharon's demands. These included an IDF landing in
Jounieh and joint IDF-LF operations in West Beirut against PLO positions,
including the refugee camps. Sharon told Bashir, "We'll get to Beirut. Don't
you worry". He also met with the Maronite elders, Pierre Jemayel and Camille
Chamoun. Sharon returned from the visit more determined to invade Lebanon,
according to AMAN Commander Saguy.*(Black and Morris, 372-373) Sharon's
visit was followed by visits by C-o-S Eitan and other IDF and intelligence
officials, all of which included attempts at persuading the LF to
participate in the Invasion, especially in "mopping up" operations against
Palestinian targets. The visit that sealed the fate of Lebanon was on April
1982, when Northern Command OC Amir Drori led a team of high-ranking IDF and
IAF officers on an intelligence gathering mission. The LF Commander Fady
Ephraim and later Bashir Jemayel met with them. Once again the LF repeated
their insistence of refusing any joint operations or an IDF landing in
Jounieh. Despite this clear disparity between what the LF leadership was
saying and what Sharon expected them to do, the IDF was still poised to
invade. At the end of April, Northern Command OC, Drori reported that the
IDF had "the most thoroughly planned war in its history". This now included
built positions for the artillery, launch platform for tanks, complete
aerial mapping of the areas to be occupied with US-provided satellite images
of Syrian positions in Lebanon and Syria, and the activation of the informer
networks in Southern Lebanon (Schiff +Ya'ari, 54).*

With the necessary military information AMAN was ready, and so was the
Shin Bet who had lists of Palestinian activists and a web of informers in
all camps. The Mossad had handed the issue of diplomacy with the LF to
Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, laden with the illusion of friendship and
alliance with their Maronite allies. The Israelis had prepared well, but
they were not quite ready to occupy the politically complex country. They
went ahead anyway on June 1982.

Although at its heart, (Peace of Galilee) was Ariel Sharon's plan, but all
the power brokers in the Israeli military and security structures were
equally if reticently, committed to the Invasion. This fact needs to be
emphasized; DM Ariel Sharon with PM Menachem Begin's blessing and Rafael
Eitan complicity, was in complete control of what, at the end of April 1982,
Northern Command Operations Commander, Amir Drori reported to be the IDF's
"most thoroughly planned war in its history" (Schiff +Ya'ari, 54). The heads
of the 3 Intelligence Agencies, especially the AMAN's Yehoshua Saguy, were
all reluctant about the extent of "Peace For Galilee". Sharon made it clear
to all 3 heads that he was going to take the IDF and them to Beirut. This
reluctance to accept the Zionist-LF alliance was also apparent on the
Lebanese side. Pierre Jemayel, the Godfather of the Phalangist Party and
Bashir's father, was willing to let Israel do the dirty work in Lebanon, but
he was adamant in refusing an open alliance with Israel. On the Second week
of January 1982 in Jounieh, Pierre Jemayel told a shocked Sharon during his
first clandestine visit to Lebanon, "We are part of the Arab World. We are
not traitors. We are not like Saad Haddad."(Black and Morris, 373)

The AMAN and the Mossad, along with the Labor Opposition, would later claim
that they disagreed with DM Sharon, but typically never specifying what they
disagreed with him about. Our research shows, however, that the AMAN and
Mossad, along most Israeli politicians supported the plans to "eradicate the
PLO in Lebanon" (Schiff +Ya'ari, 66). The eradication of the PLO and its
terrorist infrastructure explicitly meant the destruction of Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon. The two points of contention, the relationship
with the LF and the war with Syria, had nothing to do with the PLO and the
Palestinians. Not once was the morality or military effectiveness of the
saturation bombing campaign and the mass arrests of all males, as clearly
defined in both versions, Little and Big Pines, debated in any of the
cabinet or military meetings before and during the Invasion.

In both books, Israel's Lebanon War and Israel's Secret Wars, we find plenty
of evidence that there was internal dissent against the (Peace for Galilee).
Especially in the ranks of the IDF, many Israelis were predicting that the
Invasion would end up in disaster since it was not clearly defined what the
military and political objectives were. Ariel Sharon was mainly responsible
for this confusion, but he was also responsible for getting the IDF and the
security agencies to join in despite the dissent. The conduct of the IDF and
the three intelligence agencies during the operation leading to the
occupation of West Beirut on the 15th of September, showed a diligence and
commitment that never wavered. The trail of death and destruction they left
behind certainly showed that despite the dissenting voices of some IDF
troops, like Dov Yermia and Avi Grabowsky, the majority of the IDF troops
acted with the brutality and cruelty that is their trademark.* Equally, the
intelligence agencies also acted without mercy, especially in their handling
of the refugee camps in the South.

The role of Israeli Intelligence in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre

The words (cover-up) and Intelligence agencies go hand in hand. There have
been several scandals and cover ups in the history of the Israeli secret
services, like the Lavon Affair in 1954 and the Bus 300 Affair in 1984. No
scandal or misdeed, however, can compare with the enormity and criminal
dimension of the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, and the cover-up that
followed. Nothing signifies the cover-up of the Israeli role in the Massacre
like the mysterious Appendix (B) of the Kahan Report, where many believe the
real role of the IDF and the 3 Secret Agencies is clarified. Nevertheless,
there is enough evidence from the testimonies of survivors, journalistic
reports, and political analysts to show the direct involvement of the AMAN
and Shin Bet in the actual massacre, as well as the complicity of the
Mossad. In fact, we can safely conclude what we already know to be true; the
Israeli government, its military and its intelligence agencies are directly
responsible for the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre.

The 3 agencies were involved in the period prior to the massacre but on
different levels and in different places. As has been mentioned above, the
Mossad was involved closely with the LF in central Lebanon. They had a
liaison office in Jounieh since the late-70's and had coordinated many of
the military and political moves between the LF and the Israeli government
(Raviv and Melman, 265). Senior Mossad officers attended most of the
meetings prior and during the Invasion. They also conducted many operations
within Beirut and participated in the horrifying bombardment of Beirut, by
sending coordinates to the IAF that pinpointed the leaders of the PLO and
their allies. Worse still, was their sending in of car bombs into West
Beirut. In relation to the S&S Massacre, the Mossad directors were aware of
the joint LF-IDF plans to remove the Palestinian refugee camp and the
transfer of their populations out of Beirut and maybe Lebanon altogether.
Although the Mossad Director, Yitzhak Hofi, was skeptical of the validity of
the alliance with the LF, the Mossad field officers were extremely friendly
with the LF personnel on the ground (Raviv and Melman, 268). Furthermore,
they were over-confident about the positive outcome of the Invasion. Sources
have told of the Mossad officers joyfully shooting their guns in the air in
the streets of Asharfiya with the LF men when Bashir was elected as Lebanon's
president (Schiff +Ya'ari, 233). Equally, this explains why the Mossad were
in a state of shock and near-despair when Bashir Jemayel was killed. Israeli
journalist Ehud Ya'ari tells of a senior Mossad officer, Nahik Navot,
hysterically digging in the rubble of the LF office in Ashrafiya looking for
Bashir Jemayel (The Lebanese War, episode 9).*

On the other hand, The AMAN and the Shin Bet were working on another level.
The former was specifically working on promoting Haddad's militia and
extended their zone of control. The AMAN even worked against any extension
of the LF control to the South, and all attempts by the LF to gain power in
Sidon during the summer of 1982 were thwarted by the IDF (Schiff +Ya'ari,
238-239). The Shin Bet played a quieter if not less malignant role. As with
all occupied Arab territories, the Shin Bet was in South Lebanon after 1978,
and followed in the steps of the IDF as they advanced towards Beirut in
1982. By the nature of their security role, the Shin Bet does not get
involved in fighting. There is no information of the Shin Bet were involved
in the Siege of Beirut, but Robert Fisk does confirm their presence in the
Cite Sportif on the 18th and 19th of September conducting interrogations
with suspected "terrorists" (Fisk, 366). There are also extensive records of
the Shin Bet in the oppression of the South until the final IDF withdrawal
to the security zone in 1985. Though mentioned 8 times in the Kahan Report,
it would seem that they only attended the meetings before and during the
massacre. They are, however, guilty after the fact since they were at the
Cite Sportif during the Massacre, and the informers that were identifying
people inside the Cite Sportif were, as is their Modus Operandi showed in
the South during the summer, recruited and run by the Shin Bet. Therefore,
and despite being implicitly cleared by the Kahan Report, the Shin Bet is no
less guilty of the crime of genocide in Sabra and Shatilla than the AMAN
that was implicated in the same report.

So why was the AMAN alone implicated in the crime, and its commander
Yehoshua Saguy dismissed? Other than being a scapegoat, it would seem
obvious that the AMAN was involved in the planning and maybe the carrying
out of the Massacre. It has to be clear that Saguy was opposed to the
alliance with the LF, and had objected heavily even before Sharon became
defense minister to any alliance with the LF. Like the Mossad who got too
close to the LF, Saguy and the AMAN had got too close to the FLA. Saguy
insisted that any future plans for an Israeli-allied Lebanon that would not
only forgive Haddad for his treason, but to also to reward him. Reports of
the meetings, including the seminal meeting between PM Begin and Bashir in
Nahariya in September 1st, show that the Israeli government and the IDF were
adamant in giving Haddad a significant role in the new Lebanese government
(Randal, 10). He was further rewarded after the Massacre when he was
re-instated into the Lebanese Army in late 1984 right before his death, and
his militia led by another traitor Antoine Lahd was maintained until May
25th 2000. He was rewarded but for what? In all likelihood, and as many
witnesses and reporters have stated, his forces participated in the Massacre
under orders from the AMAN. Therefore the Command responsibility falls on
Saguy for any atrocities committed in the South, or in Sabra and Shatilla.
Nevertheless, the exact details or "the smoking gun" are not available, and
are probably clear in the mysterious Appendix B. The simple fact is that the
AMAN was the most directly responsible Israeli Intelligence agency for the
Massacre, although all 3 agencies were equally guilty of the crime of
genocide since all 3 were involved in the planning and execution of the
Invasion of Lebanon, whose main uncontested aim was "the eradication of the
PLO infrastructure", which meant the destruction of the Palestinian Refugee
Camps in the Lebanon and the forceful transfer of its residents out of the
country. DM Sharon himself wanted them moved to Jordan where a "substitute
homeland" would be established for them after the Hashemite monarchy was
toppled (Schiff and Ya'ari, 43). Saguy knew of this and is not on record as
objecting to this goal.

In short, all 3 agencies are guilty in the crime of Sabra and Shatilla, if
on different levels. Their guilt is a foregone conclusion once the IDF
occupied West Beirut on the 15th of September, but the role of the AMAN is
far more insidious. The hypothesis is that the after the Bashir-Begin
meeting, Saguy's point of view prevailed. Sharon, Begin, and the IDF
commanders, Yaron and Saguy had realized that Bashir will not keep his any
of his promises, that there will not be a Lebanon controlled by the LF and
allied with Israel, nor will the LF or Lebanese Army expel the Palestinian
population out of Lebanon. Therefore, and as the Zionist pattern shows, the
Israeli leadership wanted to keep Lebanon divided, to punish the LF for
their betrayal, and to cause a mass flight of the Palestinians. The true and
tried method would be a Massacre that would first discredit the LF and
prevent them from unifying Lebanon under their control, plus causing a panic
in the ranks of the now undefended camps that would drive the Palestinians
out. The only problem was making it as ugly as possible but at the same time
keeping it quiet.

The Truth Exposed

For 19 years, the Israelis have managed to convince the world of
one of the biggest lies of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that lie was
embodied in the Kahan Report about the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre. The
basic line was that the Phalangists, crazed by the killing of their leader,
thirsty for revenge, attack the camps and slaughter their inhabitants. The
IDF and the 3 intelligence agencies, while guilty in trusting the
Phalangists to behave during the "mopping up" operation, were not guilty of
perpetrating the massacre itself. Furthermore, the Israelis went about
trying to convince the world that the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was a
historical anomaly, and that it was more of an error in judgment on the part
of the Begin government. To add insult to injury, the Kahan Report did hold
certain government officials and IDF officers responsible, and it did
recommend their dismissal, but the focus was on DM Sharon and AMAN Commander
Saguy. With the February 1983 issuance of the Kahan Report, Israel declared
that its conscience was clean. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Ever since, many people have swallowed the Kahan Lie and
accepted it as the truth. So what is the truth? The decision to wipe out the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon was taken many years preceding the actual
Massacre, and was taken at the highest levels of the Israeli military and
security hierarchy. In conjunction with the Zionist plans and ambitions for
the Middle East, the Israelis were intent on not only destroying the
Palestinian organizations, but removing the whole Palestinian population out
of Lebanon, by transfer and/or murder. That in essence is genocide. In 1977,
when the Likud got to power in Israel, there were enough genocidal minds
coalescing and plotting. By early 1982, the plans were ready for the final
solution of the Palestinian problem; the eradication of the PLO and the
destruction of the refugee camps in Lebanon, the transfer of the Palestinian
refugees to Jordan and the establishment of the substitute homeland, and
finally the annexation of "Judea and Samaria", as the Israelis call the
Occupied West Bank. Unlike the rhetoric of the period, the alliance with the
LF was secondary and thus can be sacrificed. As for Syria, the Israelis were
probably considering defeating it in Lebanon, then contain it and complete
its defeat at a latter stage once Lebanon was secured. The AMAN and the Shin
Bet, as well as the Mossad to a lesser degree, agreed on all these points
which constituted the "Grand design" that (Begin Five) adopted.*

The Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was not an anomaly but rather an
inevitable conclusion to the Peace For Galilee Invasion. It happened because
the Zionist decision makers, strategists, and commanders among whom members
of the 3 agencies figured prominently, wanted to happen. To say that the
Phalangists or Haddad were responsible is to give these proxies too much
credit. They were mere fronts for the IDF and the 3 security agencies. Who
was Saad Haddad or Elie Hobeika without Israeli training and direction? How
can the AMAN, the Mossad, or the Shin Bet claim ignorance about the Massacre
while they claim to be the best Intelligence agencies in the world? How can
we accept that the Kahan Report was nothing more than cover-up? And lastly,
who other than the AMAN could have planned the brutal mopping up of the
Camps, whether those in the South or in Beirut?

The Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was planned within the Invasion
plan, and it appears under the name of Operation Spark, or Operation Iron
Brain. Its finer details were worked out between the 1st of September when
the alliance with Bashir collapsed, and the 12th of the same month when
Sharon met with Bashir. The LF was perceived as unreliable and that the
mopping up of the camps was to proceed with or without them. The AMAN could
rely on the SLA to get the job done, and it would assist them with IDF
special forces, or Sayerets as they are called in Hebrew. It is quite clear
that the Sayerets were in the camps as the former fighters in the camp have
told us, but we have not been able to identify which unit it was exactly.
But the presence of the Sayerets indicates clearly that the Massacre was
what is called in intelligence lingo a Black Operation, which is a secret
operation that is carried out by the intelligence agents and special forces
upon a decision taken by the Chief Executive and a few of his ministers.
Israeli Secret Services and the Sayerets have carried out many Black
Operations, including the Qibya Massacre of 1953, the attack on the Beirut
International Airport in 1968, and the assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunis
in 1988. During the 1982 Invasion, and according to IDF historian Samuel
Katz, the Sayerets were deeply involved in the military operations, who are
like all special forces in the world are made up of hard and brutal killers
who volunteer for the job and know exactly what it entails.* In short,
Israel's Secret Services' role in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre is not
only undeniable, but is far more involved than what the Kahan Commission
stated. One day when Appendix B finally comes to light, this theory will be
proven, although it is clear that there is enough evidence to back it up. As
an epilogue, Israel's secret services, probably the Mossad, assassinated
Elie Hobeika in Beirut in 2002, using Syrian & local witting proxies, in
what is obviously an attempt to conceal the truth about the Massacre. If
anyone doubted the involvement of the Israeli intelligence, this should
silence the naysayers.


1- Benny Morris. Righteous
Victims. Vintage Press; New York, 2001.

2- Dan Raviv and Danny Melman.
Every Spy a Prince. Houghton Miflin; Boston, 1990.

3- Edgar O'Ballance. Civil War in
Lebanon: 1975-1992. Macmillan Press; London, 1998.

4- Ian Black and Benny Morris.
Israel's Secret Wars. Futura Publications; London, 1991.

5- Jonathan C. Randal. Going All
The Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon.
Viking Press; New York, 1983.

6- Michael Jansen. The Battle of
Beirut. Zed Press; London, 1982.

7- Robert Fisk. Pity the Nation.
Simon and Schuster; New York, 1990.

8- Samuel M. Katz. Israeli Elite
Units since 1948. Osprey Publishing; London, 1988.

9- Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari.
Israel's Lebanon War. Simon & Schuster; New York, 1984.


* The only source of information on this unit is available in former Mossad
agent, Victor Ostrovsky's (By Way Of Deception). Judging by the general
reluctance in accepting all the info in Ostrovsky's book by many
intelligence analysts, we should be skeptical in affirming AI's existence.

*For more details on Israel's aggression against Lebanon see

* Today, there had been no change in this confusion in the ranks of Israel'
s intelligence agencies, where there is still no Lebanon policy, except
perhaps "Stay out". (See Ha'aretz article Fighting Blind
( for more on the confusion and
discord plaguing the IDF, AMAN, Mossad, and Shin Bet in the face of the
Lebanese resistance.

* Saguy is on record badgering the DM after the meeting with Pierre Jemayel
about the lack of wisdom in the alliance with the LF. Saguy believed,
according to the minutes of the meeting, that the LF will let Israel carry
the load by itself. Most high ranking military officials in the IDF shared
Saguy's low opinion of the LF.

* Even at this juncture, Sharon's declared political objectives to the
Americans and his own cabinet, and those known to and supported by Begin,
Eitan, Shamir, and Arens were very different. Drori has his reservation.
Saguy and Mossad Director Hofi are the only voices of dissent. It is worth
noting that the duplicity, the collusion and dissent were all about a
specific point; a wide war with Syria and/or the alliance with the LF, or
Phalangists as they were known in Israel. Not one voice within the civilian,
security and military circles spoke once against the "Eradication of the PLO
infrastructure in Lebanon."

* Dov Yermia, a reservist wrote a seminal book (My War Diary), which is a
clear condemnation of the IDF's brutality and inhumanity during the 1982
Invasion. Another soldier, Lieutenant Grabowsky, a deputy commander of a
tank company near the Sabra and Shatilla camps, who testified before the
Kahan Commission, was another well known dissenters.

* See our website to read Navot's testimony to the Kahan Commission

* The Begin Five were five individuals in the Israeli government who pursued
the goals of this Zionist Grand Design and they were: Prime Minister
Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak
Shamir, Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, and Israeli Ambassador to the US Moshe

* The Sayerets are like all special forces in the world are made up of hard
and brutal killers who volunteer for the job and know exactly what it
entails. Such units work in total secrecy and are not trained to take
prisoners or hold positions. They carry out what the Americans call "search
and destroy" missions. Sayeret Metkal .


One has to respect the Israelis and the press for publishing
this kind of Op-Ed!

Forgive us our racism
By Goel Pinto

The murder of Taysir Karaki of Beit Hanina, 35 and the father of five, was
carried out by a single individual, but the soil on which the Jewish-French
terrorist Julian Soufir thrived nevertheless bears collective examination.

More than a few French Jews explained during the recent presidential
election campaign that they were for Nicolas Sarkozy because of the iron
fist he employed against first-generation Muslim immigrants in the Paris
suburb riots of 2005. His unequivocal support for the Jewish community after
Ilan Halimi's murder in 2006 and the fact he ascribed anti-Semitic motives
to it also helped Sarkozy to win over many French Jews. Remarks along the
lines of "the Arabs are taking over France" and "we need a real man to put
things right here" were voiced by more than a few Jews during the campaign.

There are 600,000 Jews living in France today. Unlike the children of the
Muslim immigrants, many French Jews have obtained senior positions and
garnered the respect and protection of the government. In a state that
champions the obliteration of religious identity in favor of a universal
identity as members of the republic, the Jews have played both sides of the
field. On the one hand, they integrated into French society, while on the
other they continued to demonstrate great loyalty to Israel and in
particular to the right-wing governments that have ruled it in recent

The militancy of many French Jews and the racism that some of them display
against Muslims are not new phenomena. I can recall one Shabbat morning in a
Paris synagogue. I was 12. It was during the 1982 Lebanon war, and the rabbi
recited the prayer for the State of Israel and its soldiers. The
congregation responded with interjections such as "Sharon, you show them"
and "Kill them." The rabbi made no effort to silence them. Even then it was
clear that this community, which for years had donated generously to Israel,
was using the state as a tool of revenge.

No French Jew would dare to hurt a Muslim in France. The Jewish murderer
Soufir immigrated to Israel before he murdered an Arab - and not because of
any shortage of Muslims in France. Rather, it was because in France many
Jews prefer to wrap themselves in the tallit of "victimhood" - and the
anti-Jewish incidents there give them sufficient ammunition to do so. The
image of the victim causes the government, mainly because of its own
feelings of guilt over the Vichy period, to give them broad support.

The time has come for the State of Israel to place a mirror before France's
Jews, who are dancing at two weddings at the same time. Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert and Acting President Dalia Itzik should pay a visit to the family of
the murder victim and ask for forgiveness in the name of the state and the
Jewish people, just as Jordan's King Hussein did after the murder of the
seven girls from Beit Shemesh in the Naharayim terror attack in 1997, just
as the French president and his wife, Jacques and Bernadette Chirac, and
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin did following Halimi's murder when they
attended his memorial service at a Paris synagogue.

This is also the appropriate time for the heads of France's Jewish
community, led by Chief Rabbi Yosef Sitruk, to visit the Great Mosque of
Paris and to ask for forgiveness. Forgiveness for the murder, but also for
the anti-Muslim racism that is rooted in their community, which is one of
the main causes for the deterioration in relations between Jews and Muslims
in France.